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PART  I: THE  TVO-HANDED  STRATEGY 
1.  The  present state of affairs 
Over  the last  three years  there is little doubt  that  economic  conditions  in 
Europe  have  improved.  Inflation has  fallen  to  more  comfortable  levels.  Most 
current  account  deficits  have  been  reduced,  with  some  countries achieving 
significant surpluses.  Public  finances  are  now  sounder  in  many  countries, 
with  the  primary  budget  (i.e.  net  of  interest  payments)  more  often in 
surplus  than  in deficit.  After a  period when  the strength of  the Dollar made 
European  currencies  look weak,  the  much  awaited  correction has  taken  place, 
now  raising fears  of  a  hard  landing of  the  US  currency.  Most  importantly, 
the  resumption of growth  is widespread  in contrast  to  the  experience  of  the 
early eighties. 
Yet  there is no  room  for  complacency  for at least  two  reasons.  The  first  one 
is  the unemployment  situation.  Double  digit unemployment  rates are  the  rule 
rather  than  the exception,  and  no  relief seems  in sight,  in  the near  future. 
As  of  May  1987,  there were  16.1 million unemployed  (seasonally adjusted)  in 
the  12  countries  of  the European  Community,  that  is 11.4 % of  the  labour 
force.  Total  unemployment  has  not  changed  over  the  last  12  months. 
Significant  decreases  in  the  UK  and  Portugal have  been  matched  by  increases 
in most  other countries.  In Germany,  while  total unemployment  has  come  down 
by  40  thousand,  GOP  growth  has  been  negative  for  the last  two  quarters. 
Short-run prospects  therefore  look  bleak,  with  a  genuine  danger  that 
unemployment  may  rise again.  Mass  unemployment  represents a  waste  of human 
resources,  as well as  a  major  social  problem  with  unpredictable  long-run 
political and  economic  implications. 
The  second  cause of  concern  is  the  diappointingly  low  rate  of  private 
investment,  now  around  19  percent  of  GNP  as  compared  to  22  percent  in  the 
sixties.  Although  this  may  be  of ·limited  immediate  consequence,  it bears  the 
seeds  of  a  long-term  economic  stagnation.  For  some  reason Europe  is not 
using and  accumulating  factors  of  production as  in  the  past;  this  is  bound 
to affect  future  living standards. -2-
This  report  takes  as  its premise  that  Europe  still very much  needs  to  enact 
growth  enhancing  policies.  Ve  first  recall  why  the  present  level of 
utilisation and  rate of accumulation of  resources  is not  optimal.1  Ve  then 
consider  what  corrective actions  might  be  taken.  Of  course  the major  reason 
why  these have  not  yet  been  carried out  is  that  a  certain number  of  apparent 
constraints on  policy makers  stand  in  the way.  It is important  to assess  the 
true seriousness of  these constraints. 
Among  these  constraints  the  question  of  external  balance  stands out. 
Although  we  regard  this  concern  as  largely misdirected  we  will  consider  it 
in  some  detail.  Ve  stress  that  the  openness  of an  economy  reduces  the 
domestic  benefits  which  a  country  derives  from  expanding  demand,  and 
conclude  that  cooperation  is a  way  out  of  this dilemma.  Accordingly,  this 
report's main  contribution is  to  consider  how  best  the  EC  countries  could 
exploit  their  differences  in size and  initial conditions  to jointly adopt 
appropriate policies.  In  particular,  the  report  highlights  the  crucial 
position  of  Germany,  France  and  the  UK  in pursuing a  set of policies  that 
will enhance  growth.  It also  recognizes  that  differences  in  objectives  may 
affect  a  country's  willingness  to  play  the  role warranted  by  the general 
macroeconomic  situation.  The  result will  be  a  collective  loss  in  overall 
effectiveness.  Ve  believe,  however,  that  the  EMS  can  serve as  a  focal  point 
for  mutually beneficial growth-enhancing policies. 
2.  Three growth alternatives 
One  way  of understanding why  and  how  Europe  fails  to adequately exploit  its 
resources  is  to contrast  current  forecasts  and  desirable outcomes.  Ve  first 
review  the  probable outlook until  the  end  of  the  decade  under  existing 
policies  and  then  consider  two  alternatives  :  the  EC  Commission  Cooperative 
Growth  Scenario and  the  type  of  performance  achieved  by  Europe  in  better 
times  during  the sixties. 
1.  All  previous  reports  of  the  CEPS  Macroeconomic  Policy  Group  have 
presented similar analyses. -3-
2.1.  The  baseline 
The  baseline projection of  the  EC  Commission  as  presented  in its 1986  Annual 
Report  (which  is  very  much  in  line  with  forecasts  produced  by  other 
institutions)  is  a  natural point  of departure and  is shown  in Table  1.  Its 
main  features  are slow growth,  moderate  inflation,  sluggish  investment  and 
an  unacceptably high level of unemployment. 
Table 1.  EC  Commission  Simulations  for  EC10 
Annual  average growth  rates,  1986-1990,  % 
Baseline  Cooperative  Scenario 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
GOP  volume 
GOP  deflator 
Employment 
Investment  a  Unemployment 
Real  unit  labour costs 
Real  wages  per heads 
Producti~ity 
Residual 
Current  account,  % of GOP 
Budget  deficit,  % of GOPa 
2.7 
3.3 
0.7 
3.7 
10.3 
-0.3 
1.9 
2.0 
-0.2 
0.6 
3.4 
Source:  European  Economy  N°30,  November  1986,  p.  44. 
Notes: 
(a)  1990  levels. 
3.5 
2.7 
1.2 
6.8 
7.1 
-1.3 
1.1 
2.3 
-0.1 
0.1 
3.9 
(b)  residual is  (6)  (7)  +  (8)  ans  is a  measure  of  changes  in labour  taxes. 
Interestingly,  given  the  situation  in  the  rest of  the world,  such  growth 
2  rates allow a  slight surplus on  Europe's  overall current  account. 
2.  This  is  quite  important  given  the  assumptions  made  for  the  rest  of  the 
world:  rising oil prices,  stable ECU/Oollar  and  ECU/Yen  exchange  rates, 
and  a  reduction  of  the  US  budget  deficit  to  1  percent  of  GNP  by  1990. 
These  assumptions  are  not  favorable  from  the  point of view  of  the 
European  current  account  which  may  exceed  the  reported  forecasts. -4-
However,  in  many  ways  the baseline projection must  be  considered as  rather 
optimistic.  The  1987  figures,  which  define  its  starting  line,  have  been 
revised  downwards  in February 1987,  relative  to  the  October  1986  forecasts. 
In every respect,  the'aggregate  revisions exhibited in Table  2  are  for  the 
worse.  Detailed  member  country  figures  (not  shown)  indicate  that  in 6 
countries out  of  12  (Belgium,  Denmark,  Greece,  France,  Ireland  and  Italy) 
unemployment  is expected  to  increase during  1987.  Furthermore  these  revised 
forecasts  do  not  even  incorporate  the latest disquieting trends  reported  on 
p.  1  above. 
Table  2.  1987  Forecasts  for  EC12 
(%  change  p.a.  unless otherwise stated) 
GDP  in volume 
Domestic  demand 
Exports  of goods  and  services 
Imports  of goods  and  services  a  Nominal  unit  labour colts 
Real  unit  labour costs 
Unemployment  rate  (%  of  labour  force) 
October  1986 
Forecast 
2,8 
3,5 
3,7 
6,2 
2,8 
- 0,7 
11,7 
February 
Forecast 
2,3 
3,2 
2,8 
5,9 
3,7 
- 0,2 
11,8 
a  Relative  develoment  of  labour  costs  per head 
productivity (real:  deflated  by  GDP  deflator). 
and  macroeconomic 
Source:  E.  C.  Commission  COM(87)77,  Table  1. 
2.2.  The  Cooperative Growth  Scenario 
1987 
labour 
In  the Cooperative Growth  Strategy proposed  by  the  EC  Commission  the overall 
growth  rate  is  raised  to  above  3  percent,  which  permits  a  decline  in  the 
unemployment  rate  to  7  percent  by  1990.  This  scenario  shares  many  of  the 
characteristics  of  the  two-handed  approach 
Macroeconomic  Policy Group.  It rightly emphasizes 
proposed  by  the  CEPS 
the  benefits  of  policy 
coordination  which  are at  the heart  of  the  present  report.  Its key  elements 
'  I -5-
are a  decline in real labour costs  achieved  through  wage  moderation  and 
decreased  labour  taxes,  a  reduction  in  income  taxes and  an  increase  in 
public  investment.  According  to  the  Commission's  estimates  (see  Table  1) 
this  would  produce  faster growth  and  lower  inflation,  at  the  expense  of a 
worsening of  the current  account.  But  even  this rather  optimistic  scenario 
fails  to bring unemployment  down  to  those  rates which  prevailed in Europe  up 
to  the  mid  seventies. 
The  Cooperative Growth  Strategy,  as  designed  by  the Commission,  calls  for  a 
cumulative  fiscal expansion  through additional public expenditures  and  tax 
reductions  adding up,  over  the  four  years  1987-1990,  to  3.2 % of  EC  10  GOP. 
By  concentrating  the effort  in  the  three largest countries  (Germany,  France 
and  the  UK),  which  account  for  70% of  EC  10  GOP,  this  scenario actually 
calls for  a  cumulative  fiscal expansion  in  these  three adding  up  (over  the  4 
years)  to 4.6 % of  their own  GOP.  Such  an  effort is of  an  order of magnitude 
altogether different  from  the  programmes  currently  under  consideration  in 
several  countries.  The  fiscal measures  decided  in Germany  for  1988-90  only 
amount  to about  1  % of its GOP;  similarly,  those  enacted  in  the  UK  for  the 
fiscal year  1987-88  and  projected  for  1988-89  constitute a  cumulative fiscal 
stimulus of  about  1.5 % of its GOP.  Jointly,  these  measures  amount  to  0.5  % 
of  EC10  GOP,  to  which  should  be  added  a  further 0.2 % increase due  to 
various  fiscal  changes  in other countries.  So  far  then,  current  fiscal  plans 
envisage a  stimulus worth  only 0.7% of  EC10  GOP,  thus  falling substantially 
short of  the Commission's  proposed  Cooperative  Strategy 3.2 % target. 
2.3.  The  golden sixties 
The  last scenario  that  we  wish  to  explore  is  a  return  to  the  kind  of 
economic  performance  achieved  by  Europe  during  much  of  its  post-war 
experience.  Its characteristics are well-known  an  average  growth  rate 
close  to 5  percent  per year and  unemployment  between  2  and  3  percent.  Such  a 
GOP  growth  rate does  not  necessarily  translate into employment  growth.  One 
benchmark  is provided  by  the Cooperative Growth  Scenario.  Its policies  imply 
a  short-run marginal  employment  coefficient  of  one  third,  so  that  a  5 
percent  annual  GOP  growth  rate would  lead  to an  annual average growth  rate 
of employment  of  1,7  %,  bringing unemployment  down  to  some  5% in 1990- an (~ 
-6-
attractive  prospect!  Another  benchmark  is  the  experience  of  the sixties 
during which  employment  growth  in Europe  was  a  mere  0.3 % per  annum.  These 
numbers  essentially  tell  us  that  growth  will  have  to  be  more  labour 
intensive  than  in  the sixties if we  wish  to  reduce  unemployment. 
Are  there  real  obstacles  standing  in  the  way  of  such  a  growth  pattern? 
Looking at aggregate  unemployment  figures  it does  not  seem  to  make  sense 
worrying about  labour shortages.  But  aggregate  figures  are often misleading. 
Current  unemployment  is concentrated amongst  the  unskilled and  in particular 
geographical areas.  Youth  unemployment  is particularly high  in all countries 
except  Germany.  A reduction  in  the  cost  of employing  unskilled  workers  may 
be  necessary  to erase such  inequalities  (see  Box  1).  Ye  return  to  this  issue 
below. 
BOX  1 
One  difficult question raised  by  our hypothetical scenario - or  by 
any  scenario embodying  significant employment  growth  concerns 
the level of skills within  the  labour  force.  Unemployment  today  is 
largely concentrated amongst  the unskilled.  There  are  two  ways  in 
which  such  a  situation  could  have  come  about.  Consider  a  given 
decline  in aggregate employment  - say 8  % for  illustration's  sake 
- which  is accompanied  by  an  increase  in unemployment  concentrated 
entirely amongst  the unskilled.  This  could  reflect  an  8  %  decline 
in  employment  at every skill level,  accompanied  by  a  reallocation 
of  some  workers  to  less skilled jobs so  that all except  the  lowest 
skill  groups  enjoy  full employment,  but  with  a  fraction of each 
group  (corresponding  to a  growing  number  of  people as  we  move  down 
the  skill ladder)  accepting employment  is less skilled jobs.  Thus 
all the  unemployment  will eventually be  concentrated  amongst  the 
least  skilled  workers.  Alternatively,  the  same  aggregate  picture 
could  emerge  if a  restructuring  of  the  demand  for  workers  of 
different  skills  (possibly  induced  by  inappropriate  wage 
differentials)  resulted  in a  loss  of  employment  at  the  lowest 
skill  level  alone,  with  no  reduction  in employment  at higher 
levels.  The  concentration of  unemployment  amongst  the  unskilled 
results  from  the  adaptation of  labour  supply  in  the  first  case, 
but  from  the  restructuring of  labour demand  in  the  second  case. 
Our  illustration  is  extreme;  both  labour  supply adaptation and 
labour demand  restructuring may  take  place  simultaneously  the 
relative  importance  of  the  two  processes  is unknown.  The  supply 
adaptation  (or "staircase") story  is  accepted  by  many  as  the 
primary  explanation.  Recently,  our  attention has  been  drawn  by -7-
Danthine and  Lambelet  (1987)  to  the  Swiss  experience,  and  in 
particular  to  the  fact  that unskilled migrant  workers,  numbering 
some  8%  of  the  Swiss  labour  force,  were  repatriated,  without  this 
being  accompanied  by  any  restructuring of  the qualification mix 
among  Swiss  workers.  That  experience  lends  prima  facie  support  to 
the  demand  restructuring  story.  If this is  the  case  throughout 
Europe  a  majority  of  the  unemployed  in  the  EC  are  simply 
unemployable  - unless either their skills are upgraded,  or else a 
reverse restructuring of  labour demand  is  induced,  for  example  by 
a  change  in  relative  prices  (i.e.  a  reduction  in  the  cost of 
employing  unskilled workers). 
(It  matters  little whether  "unskilled"  is understood  in  terms  of 
acquired  technical skills,  or  in  terms  of stable  working  habits. 
And  it should  be  clear  that  putting  the  long  term  unemployed  back 
to work  will entail a  substantial retraining cost  in either case). 
Can  capital be  the  binding constraint? It was  not  in  the  sixties.  But  the 
capital-output  ratio  has  increased  in  the  meantime.  Vith a  capital-output 
ratio as  high as  4.5,  a  growth  rate of  output at  5  %  would  require  a  net 
investment  share  of  22.5  %.  Vith  a  depreciation  rate  of  3  % this  is 
equivalent  to a  gross  investment  share of  36  %,  which  would  somehow  have  to 
be  financed.  To  fix  ideas,  the  highest gross  investment  share  reached  since 
1960  for  EClO  stood just below  29  %.  If the  capital-output  ratio  were  to 
drop  to 4  (its lowest  level was  4.1  in 1973),  the  required gross  investment 
share would  be  32% instead.3  A  traditional  savings  rate  would  seem  to 
imply  that  a  5  %  growth  rate  requires either a  significant decrease  in 
capital intensity - the kind  of decrease which  is precisely required  for  a 
more  labour  intensive growth  - or significant  borrowing  abroad,  i.e.  current 
account deficits.  It might  seem  improbable  that  the  trend  towards  increased 
3.  These  calculations are  based  on  data in Mortensen  (1984),  p.  62-65.  Vith 
K/Y  =  4.5  and  Y/Y  =  K/K  =  5%,  the  net  investment  rate is K/Y  = 
(K/K)(K/Y).  Vith  a  depreciation  rate  d  3%,  the gross  investment  rate 
is  I/Y  =  (K+d.K)/Y.  The  value of d  is inferred  from  the  1984  values  as: 
d  =  (I/Y - K/Y)/(K/Y)  = (22.5  - 9.5)/4.6 = 2.82%. -8-
capital  intensity  should  be  reversed.  Such  a  possibility should  not  he 
dismissed outright as  fanciful,  however.  The  growth  pattern of  the  sixties 
was  shaped  by  the  short  supply  of  domestic  labour  (as  evidenced  by  low 
unemployment  rates and- the  recurrent  recourse  to  immigration).  Hopefully,  a 
more  -balanced  growth  pattern might  emerge  naturally in a  period of severe 
unemployment.  It would  need  to  be  based  on  capital-widening rather  than  on 
capital-deepening  investment  hence  on  relative  factor  prices  more 
favorable  to  the adoption of labour-intensive methods  of  production  than  in 
the  sixties,  and  particularly  to  those  methods  employing  the  categories of 
workers  in  the greatest excess  supply. 
Some  reliance on  capital  imports  to  finance  increased  investment  would  also 
be  justified, despite  the  implications  for  the current account.  Provided  the 
investment  is profitable it will generate sufficient  revenues  to  finance  the 
increased  foreign  debt  burden.  This  issue is  explored  in  more  detail  in 
Section 3.3.3.  below. 
2.4.  Assessment 
Ve  consider  the  baseline  as  a  realistic,  yet  unacceptably  pessimistic, 
forecast.  Indeed  this report  is  dedicated  to  the  search  for  acceptable 
solutions  to  avoid  its  very  realisation.  The  Cooperative Growth  Strategy 
provides  a  solution which  looks  satisfactory  only  when  compared  to  the 
baseline.  Its  results are a  clear improvement  on  the  current  forecast,  yet 
they are quite modest  given  the  size  of  the  unemployment  problem.  The 
"golden  sixties" scenario,  on  the other hand,  looks  too good  to  be  true.  Ve 
fully realize that it may  be  politically  unrealistic.  What  concerns  us, 
however,  is whether it is feasible  from  an  economic  point of view;  obviously 
it requires  a  different  type of growth,  but  it is not  obvious  that  it  is 
altogether  beyond  reach.  Much  depends  upon  how  it is sought.  The  two-handed 
approach offers a  framework  within which  policies capable of achieving  more 
ambitious  results  than  the  baseline can  be  developed.  It rests on  the  same 
logic as  the Cooperative Growth  Strategy,  and  may  be  put  to  work  to  pull 
Europe  more  forcefully out  of its slow-growth,  high-unemployment,  trap. -9-
3.  The  two-handed  approach 
3.1.  The  logical  foundation 
The  two-handed  approach,  advocated  in  the  previous  reports  of  the  CEPS 
Macroeconomic  Policy  Group,  stresses  the  need  for  a  simultaneous  expansion 
of supply and  demand  so as  to  create additional  productive capacity hand-in-
hand  with  the  demand  for  its services. 
The  logic of  the  two-handed  approach  rests on  an  assessment  of  the nature of 
European  unemployment  and  on  a  parallel  assessment  of  the  conditions 
necessary  for  job creation.  In order  for  a  job  to  be  created,  two  broad  sets 
of  conditions  must  be  satisfied.  First  there must  exist a  demand  for  the 
output  generated  by  that additional worker.  Because  dismissing a  worker  is 
costly,  that  demand  should  be  sustained  long enough  to  ensure  that  the 
additional worker will  be  required  in  the  foreseeable  future.  Second, 
satisfying  that  demand  must  be  both  profitable and  physically possible: 
there must  exist spare capacity and  the  cost  of  labour  (and  other  inputs) 
must  not  be  excessive.  Keynesian  macrotheory  stresses  the  first condition; 
when  that  condition fails  unemployment  is said  to  be  "Keynesian".  Classical 
macrotheory  stresses  the  second  condition;  when  that  condition fails, 
unemployment  is said  to  be  "Classical".  The  current  European  situation 
requires  due  attention  to  both  requirements,  and  the  two-handed  approach 
does  just  that. 
The  mix  of Classical and  Keynesian  unemployment  prevailing at a  particular 
time  is of crucial relevance  to  policy decisions.  If  unem2lo~ment is  mostl~ 
Classical,  then  demand  policies  are  useless  in  the short  run,  with  the 
stimulus  likely  to evaporate  in price  inflation  and/or  imports.  Vhat  is 
called  for  is  an  expansion  of  supply,  through  increased efficiency and 
investment.  Policy should  be  "supply-friendly".  If  unemployment  is  mostly 
Keynesian,  then  demand  stimulation  is  the  required  policy,  and  entails 
little risk of  inflationary pressures.  It is  thus  important  to  diagnose  the 
relative importance of  the  two  types  of  unemployment. -10-
Such  a  classification is always  difficult,  because it  cannot  be  based  on 
direct  indicators,  such  as  the  unemployment  rate itself,  or on  national 
accounts data.  Keynesian  unemployment  is predicated upon  the  existence  of 
simultaneously  unused·  labour  and  capital capacity.  Classical unemployment 
would  follow either from  the  absence  of  physical  equipment  to  be  manned  by 
new  hires  or  from  excessive  labour costs.  Although  systematic quantitative 
analysis along  these lines is relatively recent  and  still  fragmentary,  the 
available  evidence  is  entirely  consistent  in  suggesting  that  European 
unemployment  exhibits  both Classical and  Keynesian  features.4 
Ye  interpret  this evidence as  indicating  that  unemployment  is Keynesian  at 
the  margin,  and  Classical  beyond:  a  demand  expansion would  quickly eliminate 
the  Keynesian  unemployment  component  and  trigger  inflationary pressures  as 
bottlenecks are  reached.  An  indication of  the seriousness of  the  situation 
is  provided  by  business  surveys  in  industry.  Table  3  indicates  that  current 
use of capacity is slightly below  the  1979-80  peak  level.  The  extent  to 
which  capacity  is reported excessive  in relation  to  demand  expectations  is 
much  higher  (10  %)  than  the  1979  peak  level,  however  confirming  that  we 
currently face  a  conjunction of  low  demand  and  fully used  capacity. 
This  high level of capacity utilisation,  despite  the  low  level of  demand,  is 
the  result  of  both extensive scrapping and  the  low  rate of  new  investment 
which  prevailed  in Europe  over  the last decade.  Capacity has  adjusted  to  a 
slow  growth  environment,  transforming  a  slow growth  trap  into a  capacity 
trap.  Indeed,  during a  prolonged  period of weak  demand,  it is  rational  for 
producers  to  adjust  downward  their capacity  to  this demand.  This  constant 
adaptation  of  the  capital stock  to  the  level of  demand  is  illustrated  in 
Figure  1:  despite  continuously  growing  slack  in  the use  of  labour,  the 
degree  of capacity utilisation oscillates within relatively narrow  margins. 
4.  That  evidence arises  from  a  variety of studies  based  on  widely different 
methodologies:  see  the  special  issue  of  Economica  (1986,  Supplement), 
Yorld  Economic  Outlook  (April  1987),  Lambert,  Lubrano  and  Sneessens 
(1984),  Bruno  and  Sachs  (1985),  Sachs  and  Yyplosz  (1986).  It matters  a 
lot  that  these studies generally lead  to  the  same  conclusion. T
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Figure  1 
Rate of unemployment  and  capacity utilization 
in industry in  the Community 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
--Period  prior ot the 1973 oil shock 
- 1973-79 business cycle  =  1979-85 business cycle 
75  80 
Capacity utilization in industry 
Quarterly observations are shown. with the yean marked apinst the fint quarter. 
Source:  European  Economy,  n°  26,  November  1985 
The  result  is  a  frustrating  situation  where  no  demand  stimulus  is 
implemented  because  of  the  absence  of spare capacity,  while  there does  not 
exist spare capacity because  demand  has  been,  is,  and  is  expected  to  be 
weak.  This  is  the  rational  for  the  two-handed  approach:  capacity constraints 
must  be  eliminated via appropriate supply-side policies  while  demand  must 
expand  to  trigger an  upward  adjustment  of productive  capacity. 
3.2.  The  agenda 
If  Europe  is  to  break  out  of  the  capacity-trap and  grow  faster,  more 
efficient use  mmust  be  made  of available production possibilities and  these 
possibilities  extended  through  capacity-widening  investment.  The 
profitability of  investment  and  hirings  requires a  conjunction  of  adequate 
profit  margins  and  adequate demand  expectations.  The  policy challenge is  to -13-
bring about  these  two  conditions simultaneously:  either of  them  in isolation 
would  be  ineffective. 
Ideally,  one  would  like  to see capacity expand  first,  in anticipation  of  a 
growing  demand,  that  could  then  be  satisfied without  resistance.  It is 
unlikely  that  business  investors would  harbor  such  confident  expectations, 
however,  leaving  governments  with  the option of  implementing  policies  that 
remove  inefficiencies and  raise profit  margins  whilst  at  the  same  time 
raising  effective  demand  in  anticipation  of  the  prospective growth  of 
supply5  The  policy mix  is  thus  bound  to  be  comprehensive.  Success  is 
predicated  upon  determination  in  using  the  two  hands,  and  can  be  further 
enhanced  by  selecting measures  which  have  beneficial effects on  both  supply 
and  demand. 
Starting with  policies  aimed  at  raising  productive  efficiency  and  the 
profitability of  investment,  they  should  consist  of  the  following: 
(1)  medium-run  labour cost  reductions  achieved  through  a  combination  of 
continued wage  moderation  and  cuts  in  labour  taxes; 
(2)  wage  differentiation,  i.e.  a  more  pronounced  reduction  in  overall  wage 
costs  for  unskilled workers  and  for  workers  in depressed  areas; 
(3)  infrastructure public  investments  likely  to raise productive efficiency, 
especially  in regions  with high  unemployment  and  a  correspondingly high 
growth  potential; 
(4)  elimination  of  wasteful  subsidies and  the  introduction of  measures  to 
speed  up  the  creation  of  an  internal  Common  Market  (deregulation, 
liberalisation,  etc6); 
(5)  measures  to  enhance  the efficient use  of  capital and  labour  through  more 
flexible  working  schedules,  hopefully  including  some  uncoupling of 
5.  The  rationale for  a  demand  stimulation  that  leads  the  expansion  of 
supply  (but  not  the  measures  designed  to  bring  it  about)  has  been 
expounded  by  Giersch  (1987b)  under  the  label of  the  "Schumpeter  Case". 
6.  See  Giersch  (1987a). (3) 
-14-
worker  time  and  company  time.7 
The  first  point  is  essential  to  generate  the  medium-run  profitability 
expectations underpinning  new  investment  and  hirings.  Visible  progress  has 
been  accomplished  recently  on  the  front  of  wage  moderation:  in every 
country,  except  the  UK,  real unit  labour costs have  declined  - the  average 
decrease  in  the  Community  being 2.5 %over  the  past  two  years  (see Table 4). 
Continuing wage  moderation  is essential and,  in particular,  adverse  terms  of 
trade  movements  should  not  lead  to  compensating  changes  in wages.  In  some 
countries  this would  require altering formal  or  informal  indexation clauses: 
we  do  not  underestimate  the  far  reaching  implications of  this measure,  yet 
we  wish  to stress its importance  for  the  medium-run  evolution  of  labour 
costs. 
Table  4.  Growth  in real unit  labour  costs{a)  (%  p.a.) 
1974-1981  1982-1986  1987 
Belgium  1.4  - 1.5  - 0.8 
Denmark  0.2  - 1.6  2.4 
Germany  o.o  - 1.3  0.4 
Greece  2.6  - 0.6  - 1.7 
Spain  - 0.2  - 2.5  0.2 
France  1.1  - 1.0  - 1.4 
Ireland  0.7  - 2.1  - 0.2 
Italy  0.6  - 0.9  - 1.2 
Netherlands  - 0.2  - 1.6  1.6 
Portugal  1.5  - 4.8  - 1.0 
UK  - 0.1  - 0.1  0.3 
'-------
EC  12  0.4  - 1.2  - 0.3 
u.s.A.  o.o  o.o  0.2 
Japan  0.8  - 0.5  o.o 
Source:  EC  Commission 
Note:  (a)  wage  bill divided  by  value added. 
7.  See  Dreze  (1986). -15-
However,  only  so  much  can  be  achieved  through wage  moderation.  Fortunately, 
labour  cost  reductions  can  also  be  achieved  through  lower  labour  taxes.  The 
scope  for  labour  tax  reductions  is  best  shown  by  considering  the  costs 
incurred when  an  unemployed  worker  is hired.  The  employer will  face  the  full 
cost,  which  includes wages  and  all labour  taxes  (social security,  income). 
For  society as  a  whole,  though,  not  only  do  taxes  no  longer  appear  as  a 
cost,  but  in addition  there  is  the extra saving of  the  unemployment  benefits 
which  need  not  be  paid.  The  size  of  this  divergence  between  privately 
incurred  costs  and  their public,  i.e.  budgetary,  equivalent  is documented  in 
Table  5,  which  gives  some  numbers  based  on  average  labour  taxes  and  social 
security  contributions  (i.e.  we  look  at  the  marginal  cost  of  moving  an 
average  worker  from  the situation of  being  unemployed  to  the  situation  of 
being  employed).  Ideally  we  would  like  to  have  comparable  figures  for 
unemployment  benefits.  In  the  absence  of  such  data  for  most  countries,  we 
have  assumed  for  all  countries  a  replacement  ratio  (the ratio of average 
nnemployment  benefits  to  average  earned  income)  of  50  % based  on  estimates 
provided  by  Layard  and  Nickell  (1986)  for  the  UK. 8  Of  course  a  better 
measure  would  use  the  figures  applicable  to  a  marginal  worker.  Because  of 
such  imperfections,  Table  5  should  be  interpreted with  due  caution.  From 
Table  5,  we  learn  that  the  various  taxes  which  contribute  to  raise  the  cost 
of  labour,  although  somewhat  different  from  country  to  country,  are 
sufficiently large  to offer a  sizeable  room  for  manoeuvre. 
The  significance of  the  wedge  between  the  private and  public cost  of  labour 
can  be  expressed alternatively in  terms  of  the  wedge  between  the  private and 
public  marginal  efficiency of  capital,  for  a  capacity widening  investment. 
In  the  private calculations,  the additional  labour  employed  to  operate  the 
new  facilities enters at its private cost.  From  a  public viewpoint,  part  of 
that  cost washes  out  - namely  all  labour  taxes,  plus  the  unemployment 
benefits  no  longer accruing  to  the  newly  hired workers.  Thus,  from  a  public 
viewpoint,  the  marginal  efficiency of  capital  is  higher  and  the  private 
8.  Limited  evidence  for  other  countries  presented  in  OECD,  Employment 
Outlook  (1984)  confirms  that  this ratio is a  reasonable number. N
e
t
 
w
a
g
e
s
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
s
a
l
a
r
i
e
s
 
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
 
1
)
 
(
 
2
)
 
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
 
4
1
.
9
 
1
3
.
5
 
D
e
n
m
a
r
k
 
5
1
.
9
 
1
.
9
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
 
2
9
.
1
 
1
6
.
9
 
G
r
e
e
c
e
 
3
2
.
8
 
1
0
.
3
 
S
p
a
i
n
 
3
4
.
1
 
1
2
.
1
 
F
r
a
n
c
e
 
3
2
.
9
 
2
1
.
3
 
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
 
4
8
.
9
 
5
.
8
 
I
t
a
l
y
 
4
3
.
0
 
1
2
.
6
 
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
 
2
5
.
9
 
2
5
.
4
 
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
 
3
7
.
8
 
1
0
.
8
 
U
.
K
.
 
4
4
.
9
 
1
0
.
7
 
U
.
S
.
A
.
 
4
6
.
0
 
9
.
0
 
(
a
)
 
J
a
p
a
n
 
4
8
.
4
 
1
5
.
2
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
E
C
 
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
5
.
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
r
e
d
u
c
i
n
g
 
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
1
9
8
5
 
-
%
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
 
I
n
c
o
m
e
 
t
a
x
 
p
a
i
d
 
b
y
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
(
 
3
)
 
1
1
.
0
 
2
4
.
2
 
7
.
9
 
2
.
8
 
3
.
4
 
1
0
.
2
 
5
.
1
 
7
.
2
 
2
.
4
 
8
.
9
 
1
0
.
5
 
(
b
)
 
6
.
5
 
(
b
)
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
(
d
)
 
t
a
x
e
s
 
(
 
4
)
 
2
4
.
5
 
2
6
.
1
 
2
4
.
8
 
1
1
.
1
 
2
4
.
7
 
1
6
.
0
 
1
7
.
7
 
3
2
.
6
 
1
3
.
2
 
1
9
.
6
 
1
9
.
5
 
2
1
.
7
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
c
o
s
t
 
f
a
c
e
d
 
(
e
)
 
b
y
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
 
(
 
5
)
 
6
6
.
4
 
7
8
.
0
 
5
3
.
9
 
4
3
.
9
 
(
c
)
 
4
6
.
2
 
5
7
.
6
 
6
4
.
9
 
6
0
.
1
 
5
8
.
5
 
5
1
.
0
 
6
4
.
5
 
6
5
.
5
 
7
0
.
1
 
R
a
t
i
o
:
 
(
f
)
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
-
B
u
d
g
e
t
a
r
y
 
c
o
s
t
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
X
 
1
0
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
c
o
s
t
 
(
6
)
 
6
8
.
5
 
6
6
.
7
 
7
3
.
0
 
6
4
.
3
 
(
c
)
 
6
3
.
1
 
7
1
.
4
 
6
2
.
3
 
6
4
.
6
 
7
7
.
9
 
6
2
.
9
 
6
5
.
2
 
6
4
.
9
 
6
5
.
5
 
N
o
t
e
s
:
 
(
a
)
 
1
9
8
4
;
 
(
b
)
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
t
a
x
;
 
(
c
)
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
t
a
x
e
s
;
 
(
d
)
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
t
a
x
e
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
t
a
x
e
s
 
(
4
)
 
=
 
(
2
)
 
+
 
(
3
)
;
 
(
e
)
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
c
o
s
t
 
f
a
c
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
n
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
m
 
o
f
 
n
e
t
 
w
a
g
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
a
l
a
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
o
f
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
(
5
)
 
=
 
(
1
)
 
+
 
(
4
)
;
 
(
f
)
 
t
h
e
 
b
u
d
g
e
t
a
r
y
 
c
o
s
t
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
c
o
s
t
 
l
e
s
s
 
l
a
b
o
u
r
 
t
a
x
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
l
e
s
s
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
(
a
s
s
u
m
e
d
 
t
o
 
b
e
 
S
o
%
 
o
f
 
n
e
t
 
w
a
g
e
s
)
:
 
h
e
n
c
e
,
 
(
6
)
 
=
 
[
(
4
)
 
+
 
1
/
2
 
(
1
)
]
 
I
 
(
5
)
 
1
-
'
 
0
 
~
 
(
1
)
 
0
.
.
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
I
»
 
a
"
 
0
 
c
:
 
1
'
1
 
1
'
1
 
(
I
)
 
e
n
 
0
 
c
:
 
1
'
1
 
(
'
)
 
(
I
)
 
e
n
 
1
-
'
 
t
D
 
<
 
t
D
 
1
-
'
 
0
 
1
-
h
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
:
:
s
 
<
 
t
D
 
e
n
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
a
 
t
D
 
:
:
s
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
e
n
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
0
 
0
 
1
-
'
 
0
 
~
 
'
"
C
 
c
:
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
3
 
0
"
1
 
0
 
1
'
1
 
(
1
)
 
e
n
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
3
 
"
0
 
1
-
'
 
~
 
.
.
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
:
:
r
 
(
1
)
 
I
»
 
0
.
.
 
0
.
.
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
0
 
:
:
s
 
I
»
 
1
-
'
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
:
:
s
 
<
 
(
1
)
 
e
n
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
3
 
(
1
)
 
:
:
s
 
.
.
.
.
.
 -17-
positive externality  for  the government  budget.9  The  full  externality  is 
the  difference between  the  private and  social cost of  the  labour drawn  into 
use  by  the additional  investment. 
Turning  to  policies  aimed  at  raising effective demand,  they  should 
consist of fiscal measures  (as detailed  below)  resulting  for  Europe  as  a 
whole  in  temporarily  larger  public deficits.  (However  this does  not  mean 
higher deficits in every  country;  we  discuss at  length  in  section  7  the 
country  specific  aspects  of  this general  policy.)  These  temporary deficits 
are  to  be  financed  primarily  by  borrowing  and  to  be  offset  by  future 
surpluses  with  a  clear  commitment  not  to  resort  to  inflationary finance. 
Money  growth  should  only accomodate  any  anticipated  growth  in  potential 
output.  In what  follows,  the  fiscal expansion  is assumed  to  take  this  form. 
Ve  explain  in section  3.3.2.  why  such  a  policy  of  substituting  taxes 
tomorrow  for  taxes  today will  indeed  be  effective in raising demand. 
As  for  the fiscal measures  themselves,  cuts  in  labour  taxes  are  probably  the 
most  efficient  means  to  reduce  the  wedge  between  the  private and  budgetary 
cost  of  labour and  to discourage capital deepening,  hence  our  recommendation 
to  focus  on  them.  Although  this  is  not  the  place  to  discuss  in detail 
alternative schemes  of  labour  tax cuts,  we  would  favour  maximising  their 
employment  impact  by  concentrating  their effects on  segments  of  the  labour 
force  where  the underutilisation of  labour  is greatest,  e.g.  the  long  term 
unemployed,  the  young,  the  unskilled,  and  the  depressed areas.  10  The 
immediate  effect of  a  cut  in  labour  taxes  is  to  raise profits.  This  affects 
both  consumption  and  investment.  The  effect on  consumption  is indirect via 
higher dividend  income  and  stock market  wealth.  The  effect  on  investment  is 
more  direct.  Both  channels  however  involve substantial lags.  This  suggests 
9.  Our  reasoning assumes  that  the  added  capacity will  be 
the  investment  would  not  take  place.  Ye  are  thus 
previous  point  that  investment  and  employment  require 
profitability and  adequate  demand  expectations. 
used.  Otherwise, 
led  back  to  our 
both  sufficient 
10.  For  instance,  the  objective of giving priority  to  the unskilled  may  be 
satisfied  through  an  exemption  level  below  which  social  security 
contributions are waived  or  reduced;  see Blanchard et al.  (1985,  p.  32) 
or Dreze  (1987,  p.  30). -18-
complementing  labour  tax cuts with  reductions  in  income  taxes.  Lower  income 
taxes  would,  of  course,  help significantly  to  promote  wage  moderation.  It is 
thus  comforting  to note  that  both  the  UK  and  Germany  have  recently announced 
income  tax  reductions.  In  addition  to  these  tax cuts,  there is scope  for 
increased  investment  in public services and  in  the  infrastructure,  both  at 
the national and  European  levels.  This  is an  area which  has  been  excessively 
squeezed  in recent years.  Any  project which  yields  an  adequate  social  rate 
of  return  fits  naturally  into  the  proposed  fiscal measures.  Ve  advocate 
measures  which  simultaneously have  desirable  effects  on  both  supply  and 
demand.  Ve  will  henceforth  refer  to  this  set of measures  as  a  supply-
friendly  fiscal expansion. 
3.3.  The  risks 
In one  form  or another,  the  two-handed  approach  has  now  been  advocated  for 
some  time,  e.g.  the Cooperative Growth  Strategy.  Ve  cannot  avoid  therefore 
asking why  progress  is so  slow.  Of  course it may  be  simply  that  the  logic of 
the  two-handed  approach  is not  (yet  ?)  readily apparent,  but  it is likely 
that other concerns  prevent  its adoption.  The  current  emphasis  on 
is  most  likely  explained  by  governments'  fears  of  three 
patience 
possible 
consequences  of  any  fiscal expansion,  no  matter  how  supply-friendly:  (i)  a 
resurgence  of  inflation;  (ii)  escalating  budget  deficits;  (iii)  a 
deteriorating current account.  Ve  believe  that  these  fears  are  largely 
unfounded.  Let  us  briefly sketch  our  arguments. 
3.3.1.  Inflation 
It  is perfectly understandable  that  governments  which  have  invested  so  much 
effort and  reputation  into  the battle against  inflation now  wish  to solidify 
their  success.  Emphatically,  we  share  this  view.  It is  important  to  note 
that  the policies  that  we  advocate  rely  on  supply-expanding  and  cost-
reducing  measures,  so  that  by  their very  design  they are unlikely  to  present 
major  inflationary risks.  Quite  to  the  contrary,  they  have  a  built-in  anti-
inflationary  bias.  This  is why  we  believe  that  the  inflationary risks  of  a 
supply-friendly fiscal expansion are limited,  especially  in  comparison  to 
the costs of  remaining  caught  in  the  present  slow-growth  trap. -19-
3.3.2.  Budget  deficits 
The  budgetary  picture  shares  many  features  with inflation.  The  process  of 
financial  consolidation is still under  way  in most  European  countries,  so 
that  the  time  might  seem  ill-chosen  to  contemplate  measures  which  will 
result  in heightened deficits.  Budget  deficits  are  a  natural  source  of 
concern,  in  particular  because  they  result  in higher  public debts.  In  the 
long  run,  the  main  issue is  the  public debt  and  the  ability  to  meet  the 
required  interest  payments.  To  the  extent  that  the  proposed  strategy 
generates  faster growth  and  more  employment,  it  will  not  only  generate 
welfare  gains  by  releasing unused  resources,  but  also additional receipts 
for  servicing  the  burden  of  the additional debt. 
This  is  not  the  place  to  review  the  literature on  the  burden  of  the  public 
debt.  Ve  shall only  consider a  point  which  has  received  limited attention so 
far. 11  It  concerns  the  question  whether  raising  the  debt  today  serves  a 
useful  purpose,  given  that  fiscal  policy  will  have  to  be  eventually 
tightened  in  order  to  honour  the debt.  This  will  be  the  case if aggregate 
output  is currently insufficient  so  that  the  deficit  serves  the  useful 
purpose  of  inducing an  intertemporal substitution in  the demand  for  labour, 
away  from  a  (future)  period of  full employment  towards  a  (current)  period  of 
unemployment.  The  net  gain is measured  by  the difference  between  the  private 
and  public costs of  labour at  a  time  of  underemployment.  This  argument 
assumes  that  when  the deficit is later eliminated,  the  reduction  in labour 
12  market  distortions will have  achieved  "full" employment. 
Of  course  the  argument  just presented  rests  upon  two  important  premises. 
First  the  fiscal expansion must  not  be  undercut  by  the  crowding-out  effect 
of  an  interest  rate increase or an  exchange  rate appreciation.  Second,  it 
must  be  credible  that  the  debt  will  be  repaid  through  a  future  budget 
11.  Barro 
(1986) 
debt. 
(1979), 
discuss 
Lucas 
the 
and  Stokey  (1983),  Persson,  Persson  and  Svensson 
optimal  intertemporal pattern of  taxes  and  public 
12.  The  case under  consideration is also one  where  Barro's  (1974)  argument, 
that  a  fiscal  expansion  is  fully  offset  by  a  reduction  in private 
demand,  does  not  apply. -20-
surplus,  rather  than  through  the  inflation  tax.  The  second  condition is not 
likely to  be  met  in countries where  the  debt-GNP  ratio has  already  reached 
very  substantial  levels.  This  is  why  the  Cooperative Growth  Strategy is 
right  in advocating a  fiscal expansion  only  in  those  countries  where  the 
debt-GNP  ratio is lowest  - Germany,  the  UK  and  France.  The  relevant  data are 
given  in Section  7  below. 
3.3.3.  External constraints 
The  last  fear  concerns  the  external  balance.  As  in  the  case  of  a  budget 
deficit,  the current  account  feeds  into  the external debt  which  is  the  main 
external constraint.  And  upon  considering an  increase  in  the  external  debt 
the  same  criterion  should  apply,  namely  whether  the  resources  borrowed 
abroad will generate  the  proper  returns.  A fiscal  expansion  accompanied  by 
monetary  accommodation  is  bound  to  lead  to  a  "deterioration"  of  the  current 
account  (reduction of  an  export  surplus)  so  that  net  foreign  indebtedness 
will  increase  (capital  outflows  reduced).  To  the extent  that  the  current 
account  deficit  corresponds  to  additional  investment,  the additional  foreign 
debt  simply  means  that  the  country  is  relying on  the  international capital 
markets  to  finance  its expansion. 
A useful  benchmark  case  is one  where  the  government  budget  remains  balanced, 
but  the supply of private domestic  savings  fall short  of  domestic  private 
borrowing  needs.  Then  the  current  account  deficit arises  because  of  an 
increase in private  investment  as  the government  budget  remains  balanced. 
Rational  firms  will  borrow  only  if the  return on  their  investment  is at 
least equal  to  the  cost  of capital.  Much  the  same  applies  when  investment  is 
carried  out  by  the  government,  provided  that  it  abides  by  the  same 
rentability criterion.  As  long as  this  condition  is  satisfied,  borrowing 
abroad  actually  increases  national wealth,  and  the  additional  net  foreign 
debt  is more  than offset  by  the  present  discounted  value  of  the  stream  of 
future  earnings.  Because  the  latter  is  not  measurable,  a  country's net 
foreign  asset  position,  which  only  values  its  financial  assets  and 
liabilities,  may  be  almost  as  unreliable  an  indicator  as  its current 
account. -21-
Does  this  imply  that if the  current  account  deterioration reflects  increased 
current  consumption  the  country is "living beyond  its  means"?  The  correct 
answer  is  that  the  country  is facing  a  solvency constraint.  There  is an 
important  case when  there is actually no  such  constraint:  this  occurs  when 
the  country's growth  rate exceeds  the  real interest cost  of  the debt  so  that 
any  fraction of  income  earmarked  for  debt  repayment,  no  matter  how  small, 
will  be  sufficient.13  Otherwise  solvency  requires  that  current deficits  be 
matched  by  future  surpluses.  If  the  country's  ability  to  generate 
sufficient surpluses  is  in doubt  the main  outcome  will  be  a  pressure  towards 
exchange  rate depreciation,  which  in some  instances  may  take  the  form  of  a 
speculative  crisis.  But,  whatever  the mechanism  to establish solvency,  what 
is ultimately required  is a  reduction  in  aggregate  spending  relative  to 
income,  and  this  represents  the  true external cost  of  the  fiscal expansion. 
A simple calculation can  illustrate  the  point.  Up  to  the mid-seventies  most 
European  countries  were  running  current  account  surpluses  more  often  than 
deficits so  that it is natural  to assume  that  they  then started with  little 
or  no  net  external indebtness.  Assuming  a  real interest rate of  5  % and  a 
growth  rate of  2  %,  a  current  account  deficit  representing 2  % of  GNP  over 
ten  years  amounts  to a  foreign  debt  of  the size of  23  % of  GNP.  This  is  the 
worst  situation that  we  envision  for  most  countries.  To  consider an  extreme 
case  ,  with deficits as  high as  5  % for  ten years,  the  debt  would  represent 
58  % of GNP.  (Only  Denmark  and  Ireland  may  be  in a  worse  situation).  Vhat  is 
the  current  account  surplus  needed  to stabilize  the debt at such  levels  ? 
For  the  lower  level of  23  %,  a  surplus of 0.7  %  is  sufficient,  and  this 
figure  rises  to  1.8  %  when  the  debt  level  represents  58  % of  GNP.  Vhile 
these numbers  are  purely  illustrative,  they  suggest  that  the  eventual 
sacrifice  imposed  by  continuous  deficits  of  the size mostly  observed  in 
Europe  is quite moderate. 
Several  of  the  arguments  of  this section are  illustrated with  a  stylised 
numerical allegory presented  in Appendix  1. 
13.  The  point  is made  in Cohen  (1985). (4) 
-22-
3.3.4.  Deficits or debts? 
Vhile  for  both  the public  budget  and  the external account,  the  appropriate 
constraint  is  the  corresponding  debt  level  (a  stock),  policy  makers 
typically express  concerns  about  deficits  (a  flow).14  Vhat  is  the  proper 
criterion?  In  terms  of constraints,  solvency  is  the  correct  criterion and 
the debt  level is one  way  to  measure  it.15  But  in  terms  of  policy making  the 
deficit  may  also  be  relevant  criterion.  The  debt  is a  "first-order"  burden 
as  resources will eventually  have  to  be  committed  to  its  service  and 
possible  repayment.  The  deficit is a  "second-order"  burden  because  of  the 
associated macroeconomic  adjustment  costs  of  shifting  from  deficit  to 
balance  or  surplus.  For  any  target  debt  level,  the wider  the  present 
deficit,  the larger will  the needed  adjustment  be,  and  the  worse  its welfare 
implications.  The  deficit is also a  more  immediate  concern  and  thus attracts 
! 
the  policy makers  attention more  forcefully  than  the debt  which  cannot  be 
dealt with  in anything but  the  long  run. 
4.  The  bottom line 
The  policy challenge  for  Europe  today  boils  down  to  Europe  being  caught  in a 
low  growth,  high unemployment  trap,  characterised  by:  (i) substantial unused 
labour  resources  and  a  correspondingly  high  growth  potential;  and  (ii) 
production facilities  which  have  adjusted  downwards  to  low  levels  of 
effective demand.  A return  to  faster growth  requires  both  an  acceleration of 
growth  in supply and  a  revival  of  demand  expectations.  The  prevailing 
uncertainty  surrounding  the  supply  responsiveness generates  fears  in some 
official quarters  that  demand  stimulation would  evaporate  in  inflation  and 
imports,  without  any  lasting effects on  output  and  employment.  These  fears 
breed  inaction - and  hence  low  investment. 
To  break  the  vicious  circle,  a  two-handed· strategy,  of  the  kind  outlined 
above,  is needed.  Unwillingness  to  follow  such  a  two-handed  strategy  may 
reflect  a  lack of  confidence  in  the  prospective effectiveness of  the action 
14.  See  Vinals  (1986). 
15.  Buiter  (1985)  discusses  these  issues  in great detail. -23-
of either hand.  It is inescapable,  that  confidence  in  the  effectiveness  of 
both  the supply-side and  the demand-side  components  is needed  today. 
The  ultimate fear is  p.erhaps  that  the  supply-side  measures  will  be  too 
timid,  or  the  response  of  supply  too  slow,  to  avoid  inflationary and 
exchange  rate pressures as  the  fiscal  expansion  proceeds.  Ve  can  only  repeat 
that  such  pressures will be  the  less likely,  and  the  less severe,  the  more 
vigorous  and  productive  the  supply-side measures. 
Ve  do  not  claim  that  risks  of  inflationary or exchange  rate pressures  are 
totally absent.  Ve  can  only  repeat  that  they will depend  upon  the mix  to  be 
chosen  and  that  some  of  them  are  worth  taking,  given  the  current 
underutilisation of  resources  and  the  danger  of  a  further  extension  of 
unemployment  in  the near  future.  Each  government  has  to  balance its fear  of 
inflation and  deficits against  its commitment  to  fight  unemployment.  As  we 
explain  in  Section  7,  the  differences  in initial conditions  and  policy 
objectives of  the European  countries will  influence  both  their  choice  of 
policy mix  and  their willingness  to  expand. 
But  there is an  important  additional dimension  to  the  policy  challenge,  to 
which  we  now  turn.  Due  to  the  high degree of openness  of European  economies, 
cooperation in pursuing  the  two-handed  strategy  is  important  to  overcome 
specific  constraints  on  national  policies  and  in  internalising  some 
important  non-priced externalities. 
PART  II:  Atrl'ONOMY  THROUGH  FLEXIBLE  COOPERATION 
5.  Openness  and  the Case  for Cooperation 
5.1 Effects of  openness  on  fiscal  policy effectiveness 
The  analysis of Part  I  presented  the  basis  for,  and  content  of,  the  proposed 
two-handed  growth  strategy.  This  analysis  has  largely overlooked  the  fact 
that  some  European  economies  are quite open.  Openness  plays  a 
as  it  may  affects  profoundly  the  cost-effectiveness  of 
crucial  role 
the  proposed -~-
policies.  This  part  considers  the  role  of  openness  and  demonstrates  the 
16  crucial  importance of  cooperation  for  policies designed  to  enhance  demand. 
In an  economy  with unemployment  and  with  a  sizeable  wedge  between  the 
private  and  public costs of  labour,  the effectiveness of  a  fiscal expansion 
is measured  by  the additional output  and  employment  resulting from  it.  Its 
cost  is  indicated  by  the  associated  increase  in  the  public and  current 
account  deficits.  The  very  fact  that  an  economy  is  open  reduces  the 
(domestic)  effectiveness  and  raises  the  (domestic)  costs of  the  fiscal 
expansion.  Further,  this effect is  the more  pronounced,  the  more  open  is  the 
economy. 
5.1.1.  Reduced  policy effectiveness 
The  reduced  effectiveness  results  directly  from  the dampening  effect of 
additional  imports,  as  measured  by  the  marginal  propensity  to  import.  A 
given  initial  stimulus  to  demand  will  produce  fewer  jobs at  home  because 
some  of  the  demand  leaks abroad.  Although  foreigners  in  turn  may  spend  some 
of  their increased  income  on  domestically  produced  goods,  the  feedback will 
16.  One  member  of  the group  (H.G.),  while  fully  supporting  the  two-handed 
strategy described  in Part I,  wants  to  take  exception  to  Part II  to  the 
extent  that it deviates  from  the  following  position:  coordination is not 
a  necessary condition of  the strategy.  Instead of  waiting  for  others, 
individual countries  can  start on  their own,  e.g.  Germany.  This  country 
should  take  the  lead,  with or without  prior  coordination,  by  adopting 
measures  to  improve  the  competitiveness  of its domestic  locations  in  the 
worldwide  market  for  capital and  direct  investment  in order  to  transform 
its current account  surplus  into an  additional stock of capital  for  more 
permanently  productive jobs within its area:  in given  circumstances,  the 
social returns of  investment  in Germany  would  far  exceed  the  rate  of 
interest earned  from  exporting capital.  Even  smaller  countries  could 
move  ahead  without  time  consuming  prior  coordination.  Going  alone, 
however,  requires  that  the  measures  taken  promise  as  much  positive 
effects on  the supply side as  they  increase  demand.  The  supply  side 
effects are  to  improve  the  competitiveness of  domestic  producers  so  that 
the  expanding  country captures  more  of  total world  demand  at  the  time 
when  part of  the  domestic  demand  stimulus  leaks  out  to  raise  imports. 
Yhat  matters  is  the  balance  of  demand  and  supply  effects.  Coordination 
takes  only care of  the  demand  side.  Stressing  the  coordination  issue 
involves neglect  of  the supply effects and  their  importance.  It  thus 
runs  into  the danger  of  creating  a  moral  hazard  problem:  a  demand 
expansion  may  too  easily be  considered sufficient. -25-
be  staggered over  time,  and  will be  lsss  than  complete if a  fraction of  the 
income  generated  abroad  is hoarded.  Of  course,  the  import  leaks are not  lost 
at  the  world  level  they  benefit  the  suppliers  of  imports  as  an 
externality,  if  they  experience a  similar discrepancy  between  the  private 
and  budgetary  costs of labour;  we  return  to  that  point  below. 
The  fact  that  the  feedback  is staggered matters  when  the whole  purpose  of 
the  fiscal stimulus is  to  induce  an  intertemporal  substitution  in  demand, 
from  the  future  to  the  present.  How  staggered  the  feedback will  be,  depends 
on  the origin of  the  imports:  Belgian  imports  from  France,  which  in  turn 
addresses  10  %  of its own  import  demand  to  Belgium,  will  induce  a  quicker 
feedback  than Belgian  imports  from  Spain,  which  addresses  less  than  2  %  of 
its  own  imports  to  Belgium.  Det~iled linked econometric models  would  be 
needed  to estimate  the  length  of  the  lags,  but  the  argument  that  the 
feedback  is  less  than  complete,  if part  of  the  income  generated  abroad  is 
hoarded,  is standard.  One  aspect  of  that  argument  is  not  commonly  spelled 
out,  however,  and  that  aspect  is important  for  our  purposes.  In Europe, 
average  rates of gross  taxation  (ratios of  public receipts  to  GOP)  are close 
to  50  %  in many  countries.  For  a  country engaged  in fiscal stabilisation, 
this  implies  an  automatic  hoarding  of  about  half of export-led  increases  in 
income.  For  the  partner country which  contemplates  a  fiscal expansion,  it 
means  that  some  50  % of  the hoped-for  feedbacks  would  be  sterilised  at 
least  temporarily.  Again,  detailed  econometric models  would  be  needed  to 
assess  the  precise magnitude  of  this effect,  but  the  numbers  are  bound  to  be 
large.  Given  the current stress in Europe  on  fiscal  consolidation,  fears  of 
foreign sterilisation are quite natural  probably  go  a  fair  way  towards 
sustaining  the  expectation  that  th~ feedback will be  slow  and  incomplete, 
substantially reducing  the effectiveness of fiscal  policy in any  single open 
economy. 
5.1.2.  Increased costs 
The  increased  cost  of  the  fiscal  stimulus  derives  from  the externality 
corresponding  to  a  private cost  of  labour  in excess  of  its  budgetary  cost: 
the  cost  of  domestic  labour  to  the  country  is its budgetary  cost,  while  the 
cost  of  foreign  labour  is  the  full  private cost.  The  difference  between  the 
two  accrues  to  the  foreign  country  (with  only  limited  feedback  to  be -26-
expected).  To  illustrate,  if  the  Belgian  government  hires  formerly 
unemployed  Belgian workers  to  tend  the  public  parks  of Antwerp,  the net  cost 
to  the Belgian  taxpayers  is  the difference  between  the  net  earnings  of  the 
workers  and  the  unemployment  benefits  that  they  used  to  receive  (labelled 
budgetary costs  in Table 5).  If instead  Dutch  gardeners  are  hired  the  net 
cost  to  the  Belgian  taxpayers  is  the  full gross  cost  (labelled private costs 
in Table 5).  Obviously  this  increase  in  cost will  be  greater  the  more  the 
increase in demand,  and  the associated  increase in employment,  leaks  abroad, 
i.e.  the higher is  the  marginal  propensity  to  import. 
5.1.3.  Openness 
Thus,  as  the  marginal  propensity  to  import  rises,  the  domestic  cost-
effectiveness of  the  expansion  is affected,  reducing  the  country's  incentive 
to  carry it  out  on  its  own.  The  importance  of  this  point  has  been 
illustrated  vividly  by  the  "early-Mitterrand"  French  expansion  of  1981-82, 
the associated current  account  deterioration quickly  leading  to  a  reversal 
of  policy  (see  Sachs  and  Wyplosz  (1986)).  However,  if several countries 
together  form  a  relatively closed area,  they  can  reap  the full  benefits  of 
an  expansion  just  like  a  closed  economy.  We  shall argue  that  this  is  the 
case  today  in Europe,  and  particularly  that  it  is  more  reasonable  to 
advocate  a  simultaneous  expansion  by  France,  the  U.K.  and  Germany  than  to 
ask Germany  alone  to  play again  the  locomotive  role  while  France  and  the 
U.K.  postpone action until  the German  expansion  takes  momentum. 
In Appendix  2,  we  explain  why  import  shares,  corrected  for  the  import 
content  of exports,  provide an  operational measure  of  the degree  of  openness 
of  an  economy,  which  is  well-suited  for  a  discussion  of  the  cost 
effectiveness  of  fiscal  policy.  Some  figures  on  import  shares,  net  import 
shares  (imports  less  import  content  of exports),  and  marginal  propensities 
to  import  are collected  in Table  6.  It is clear  that  openness  is  inversely 
related  to  country size,  and  directly related  to  the  extent  of  economic 
integration  with  neighbouring  countries.  EC10  as  a  whole  is about  half as 
open  as  the least open  of its members.  In spite of  its larger size,  measured 
by  GDP  or population,  EC10  is still more  open  than either  the  US  or Japan. 
In part  this  reflects  a  more  limited  endowment  of  natural  resources -27-
(relative  to  the US),  in part  closer links  to  former  colonies or other non-
community  European  economies.  But  the  degree of  openness  of  Europe  as  an 
entity  is  much  closer  to  that  of  the  US  or Japan  than  to  that  of  a  typical 
member  country. 
Table  6.  Measures  of  openness  (1985) 
Import  Share  Net  Import  Share  Marginal.prope?~~ty 
to  1mport 
Belgium  76.1  44.2 
Denmark  36.7  19.8 
V.  Germany  28.7  19.8 
Spain  20.2  15.7 
France  24.9  15.6 
Ireland  58.5  40.0 
Italy  28.6  18.9 
Luxembourg  94.4 
Netherlands  59.4  25.0 
Portugal  41.9  25.5 
UK  28.2  18.7 
Greece  32.5  26.0 
EC  10  13.4 
USA  10.1 
Japan  11.4 
Source:  EC  Commission.  From  country  desks, 
Adjustment  for  import  content  of  exports  based  on 
possible. 
Note:  (a)  (1.2)  (net  import  share) 
53.0 
23.8 
23.8 
18.8 
18.6 
48.0 
22.7 
30.0 
30.6 
22.4 
31.2 
based  on  national sources. 
input-output  tables  when 
The  figures  in Table  6  prompt  us  to  the  conclusion  in  the  third part  of  this 
report  that  Europe  as  a  whole  is sufficiently closed  to  pursue  autonomous 
fiscal and  monetary  policies,  provided it can  define  and  implement  these 
policies  on  a  cooperative  basis.  The  need  for  cooperation among  European 
countries derives  from  their  high  degree  of  individual  openness,  which 
imposes  severe  constraints  on  autonomous  policy  actions  by  individual 
countries. -28-
Ve  thus  see openness  as  a  major  explanation  for  the  reluctance of  European 
Governments  to  implement  the  two-handed  strategy. 
5.2.  The  case  for  cooperation 
The  case  for  policy  cooperation 
sufficient  condition  is  that  the 
or  commodity  (labour  for  example) 
governments  make  their  policy 
is  quite  simple  and  well-known. 17  A 
private and  budgetary  costs of any  factor 
diverge  at  home  and  abroad.  Then,  if 
decisions  based  only  on  the effects on 
domestic welfare,  they will  ignore any  effect on  the allocation of  resources 
abroad.  In  the  absence  of any  wedge  between  the  private and  social costs, 
this does  not  matter  since  the  allocation  of  resources  is  efficient. 
However,  when  for  example  unemployed  labour abroad  is brought  into use  by  a 
domestic  fiscal expansion,  the  home  country  ignores  this  beneficial  effect 
in  deciding  how  large  an  expansion  to  make.  The  essential point  is  that 
there exists an  externality which  is not  properly "priced".  Hence,  we  find  a 
strong  temptation  for  each  country  to act  as  a  caboose  in-the hope  that  the 
other ones will play  the  role of  the  locomotive.  Thus  in  assessing  the 
success  of  the German-led  expansion  following  the  Bonn  summit  of  1978  - the 
"locomotive"  experiment  - one  should  take  into  account  the  effect  of 
Germany's  action  on  its  trading  partners.  Vhile  Germany  experienced  a 
deterioration in its current  account  and  some  acceleration in inflation,  it 
also  raised  the  level  of  activity  abroad.18  It  should  be  noted  that 
coordination  of  policies  is  emphatically  not  the  same  as  their 
synchronisation.  Thus  the worldwide  inflation of  1973  was  engendered  by  the 
simultaneous  but  uncoordinated  fiscal and  monetary  expansion  pursued  by  the 
industrialised economies.  The  result was  chronic overheating.19 
17.  Hamada  (1976),  Cooper  (1984),  Sachs  (1983). 
18.  Unfortunately  the  second  oil shock  and  the  contractionary 
monetary  policies it engendered  prevent  any  firm  conclusion 
overall success  of  the  experiment;  see Bean  (1985). 
fiscal 
about 
and 
the 
19.  Indeed,  it is not  generally  the  case  that  the  lack of  coordination  leads 
to over-contractionary policies.  It can  also result  in over-expansionary 
policies,  particularly under  a  fixed  exchange  rate regime. -~-
One  natural domain  of  cooperation  concerns  the  fears  of  sterilisation 
through  attempts  at  budget  consolidation by  trading partners,  as  explained 
in Section 5.1.  If  two  countires are  both  inhibited  in  their  implementation 
of  a  desirable  fiscal·expansion  by  such  fears,  it would  be  natural  for  them 
to  reach mutual  assurance  that  each  country's  expansion will not  be  partly 
offset  by  the other country's  fiscal stance.  Cooperation is  then  conducive 
to more  successful policies  in both countries. 
The  logic  of  the  case  is  elementary and  widely  recognised at different 
levels.  It is  the same  logic  of  "coordination  failure"  which  plays  an 
important  role  in microeconomic  reasoning,  to explain why  individual  firms 
operating below  capacity do  not  find  it advantageous  to  expand  output  and 
employment  individually,  in  anticipation  of  the  demand  that  would 
materialize if all firms  expanded  simultaneously. 
The  case  for  cooperation is intimately linked  to  the  two-handed  approach. 
One  hand,  that directing  the  supply side,  by  and  large  does  not  require 
cooperation.20  The  need  for  cooperation  follows  from  the  determination  to 
use  the  second  hand,  that  of  the  demand  side.  Indeed,  most  of  the  supply-
side  measures  under  consideration  can  be  implemented  at national levels  by 
individual countries acting on  their own.  Not  only  the  measures,  but  also 
their  effects,  are of  a  primarily domestic  nature.  The  incentives  to  adopt 
them  are  there,  whether  or not  other countries do  likewise.  Further,  these 
supply-side  measures  work  towards  improving  competitiveness,  so  that 
external considerations  reinforce  the  domestic  motivation.  (The  same  cannot 
be  said of measures  encouraging market  integration or  trade liberalisation. 
These  are appropriately approached at  the surpranational level.) 
The  fact  that  macro-economic  policy  cooperation  is bound  to stress  the 
demand  element  in  the  policy mix  has  a  disadvantage.  It leads  to  a  rhetoric 
that  neglects  the  supply side,  where  a  lot of hard work  is  to  be  done.  That 
20.  There exist  some  supply-side measures  which  would  still  benefit  from 
cooperation  (e.g.  when  they affect  the  internal  terms  of  trade,  or 
market  liberalization which  spills over abroad),  but  the  magnitude  of 
the gains  from  cooperation in  these  cases  is likely  to  be  small. (5) 
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disadvantage  is particularly obvious  in Part  III  of  the  present  report, 
which  of  necessity  is  devoted  almost  entirely  to  demand  side policies. 
Hopefully,  our  insistence on  the  complementarity of  the  two  sides should  be 
clear  to  the  reader·  from  Part I.  For  some  of  us,  the anticipatory demand 
expansion is even  viewed  primarily as  a  means  of  facilitating  the  removal  of 
supply  rigidities,  the  completion  of  the  internal  market  and  the 
liberalisation of world  trade.  However,  even  though  the  emphasis  placed  on 
the  two  sides  may  differ,  there  is no  doubt  in our  minds  that  only a  two-
handed  strategy can  restore acceptable rates of growth  in Europe.  There  lies 
the  most  important  message. 
6.  Europe  and  the rest of  the world 
6.1.  Little promise  for  policy cooperation 
The  income  flow  measures  presented  in  section  5.1.  capture  reasonably 
adequately  the  size  of  the  externalities  which  make  the  case  for 
cooperation.  They  reveal clearly  that  large countries,  or  country  groups, 
are  relatively  closed.  Trade  among  them  does  not  weigh  heavily  in  their 
national  incomes.  Table  7  summarises  the  relevant  data.  As  might  be 
expected,  the  cross-country  income  multipliers  between  such areas are quite 
small.  Table 8  reports  the multipliers  from  the  COMPACT  Model  a  model 
yielding  results  for  the  European  Community  as  a  whole  (EC  10).21  The  only 
sizeable entry  (.4)  concerns  the  impact  of  the  US  on  Japan.  Those  for  Europe 
are uniformly  small  (.1 or  .2). 
As  a  consequence,  the need  for  policy cooperation  between  such  large  but 
closed  entities  is  not  great.  That  conclusion is confirmed  by  the  welfare 
computations  performed  by  Oudiz  and  Sachs  (1984)  reported  in Box  2. 
21.  Where  comparable,  results  from  other models  (for  instance  those of  the 
Interlink  model  used  at  OECD,  or  the  MCM  model  used  at  the  Federal 
Reserve  Board,  or of  the  EPA  in Tokyo)  are not  markedly  different.  See, 
e.g.  Oudiz  and  Sachs  (1984)  pp.  20-21. -31-
Table  7.  Trade  flows  between  major  countries or groups 
us  EC  10 
Import  as % of  GOP  10.1  13.4 
Exports  as % of  GOP  7.0  12.8 
Exports  to  EC  10  as  % of  GOP  1.6  14.4a 
Imports  from  EC  12  as  % EC  12  GOP  3.3  14.3a 
Source:  European  Economy,  July 1986,  N°  29,  Tables  35  and  36. 
Note:  (a)  is intra-EC  trade. 
Table 8.  Cross-country  income  multipliers 
Japan 
11.4 
15.1 
1.5 
.4 
(1  % of  GOP  increase  in public expenditures  (non-wages)) 
(with non-accomodating  monetary  policy) 
(%discrepancy w.r.t.  baseline simulation 
IMPACT  ON  GOP 
Country 
taking  EC  10  us  Japan 
action  1  year  2 years  3 years  1 year  2 years  3 years  1 year  2 years 
EC  10  1.1  1.3  0.9  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1 
us  0.15  0.2  0.2  1.3  1.2  1.0  0.3  0.4 
Japan  0.05  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  1.1  1.2 
Source:  Compact  model 
3  years 
0.1 
0.4 
1.4 -32-
BOX  2:  VBLFARE  GAINS  FROM  COOPERATION 
The  welfare calculations  by  Oudiz  and  Sachs  (1984)  were  based  on 
two  large models  which  measure  the  links  between  the  US,  Japan  and 
Germany  (the  MCM  model  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  and  the 
Japanese  EPA  model).  Given  contemporary  forecasts  for  the  three 
years  1984-86  they  looked  for  the  policy  actions  which  would 
improve  the welfare of all three countries,  without  hurting any  of 
them;  welfare  is  measured  in  units  (percent)  of  GNP  and 
corresponds  to  the  perceived  costs of  falling below  potential GNP, 
inflation,  and  current  account  imbalances.  The  striking feature  of 
their  results,  reported  in  Table  9,  is how  little is achieved 
through ohtimal  coordination:  the  0.33  number  obtained  for  Germany 
means  t  at,  compared  to  uncoordinated  policy  making,  full 
coordination would  only  improve  that  country's  welfare  by  an 
equivalent  of  1/3 of  one  percent  higher  GNP  over  the  three years 
period.  Clearly,  if the best  that  can  be  achieved  is of  this order 
of magnitude,  there is little incentive  in undertaking  the  kind  of 
elaborate negotiations  that  full coordination requires. 
MCM 
EPA  Model 
MCM  Modified 
Table 9.  Welfare  gains  from  coordinations 
u.s. 
0.17 
0.03 
0.54 
Germany 
0.33 
0.03 
0.56 
Japan 
0.99 
0.32 
2.96 
Unit  of  welfare  gain equivalent  to  a  percentage of  GNP  averaged 
over  three years.  Target  valves  are:  inflation,  zero;  current 
account-GOP  ratio:  zero  for  the  US,  2%  for Germany  and  Japan. 
The  last line is based  on  a  modification of  the  MCM  with  Germany 
enlarged  three  fold  and  called  "Europe". 
Source:  Oudiz  and  Sachs  (1984). -33-
The  scope  for  coordination is best  approached  as  an  exercise  in cost-benefit 
analysis.  Small gains  may  indeed  be  worth  reaping if the  cost  in  obtaining 
them  is  minimal,  whereas  larger  gains  may  sometimes  fail  to  cover  their 
cost.  Pending  such a  quantitative analysis,  we  feel  safe in concluding  that 
the  (political?) difficulties of  coordinating policies at  a  world  level are 
22  such  that  the effort  may  scarcely be  worth  the  candle. 
6.2.  A careful exchange  rate policy 
Another  important  channel  of  transmission  of  policy  impacts  across  countries 
is  the  terms  of  trade.  Unfortunately,  the effects of  fluctuations  in  the 
terms  of  trade are more  difficult  to  capture  through  econometric  models  than 
income  effects.  Still,  we  report  in Table  10  cross-country exchange  rate 
multipliers as  estimated  by  the  COMPACT  Model.  The  picture  emerging  from 
that  table  confirms  our general  intuition:  the  impact  of  a  depreciation of 
the  US  dollar against all other currencies exerts less  influence  at  home, 
and  more  influence overseas,  than  a  comparable  depreciation of  the  ECU,  or 
even  more  so  of  the yen.  Presumably,  the  same  conclusion would  hold  for  an 
appreciation. 
Looking at Tables  8  and  10,  we  note  that  a  10  % change  in  the  value  of  the 
dollar  has  roughly  the  same  medium  term  impact  on  the  GOP  of  EC  10  as  a  2.5 
% change  in  US  national  income.  But  exchange  rates are  much  more  volatile 
than  national  incomes,  so  that  Europeans  are justifiably concerned  by  the 
real  consequences  of  the  dollar  instability.  The  current  situation  is 
dominated  by  a  considerable amount  of uncertainty.  The  sharp appreciation of 
the dollar  from  1980  to  1985  has  been  mostly  undone  by  its  equally  sharp 
depreciation  since  then.  Yhile  the  full  impact  of  this depreciation  remains 
22.  This  does  not  mean  that  Europe  does  not  stand  to  benefit  from  some 
policy actions  in  the  US.  Given  the  strong  linkages  between  financial 
markets,  a  reduction of  the  US  budget  deficit  would  be  welcome  in 
Europe.  The  exchange  rate aspect  of  these  linkages  is  taken  up  in  the 
following  section. Country 
taking 
EC  10 
USA 
Japan 
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to  be  felt,  a  further sizeable depreciation is seen  by  some  (see  Dornbusch 
and  Frankel,  1987)  as  a  distinct possibility.  The  effects on  the  exchange 
rate of an  acceleration of growth  in Europe  must  be  considered  in such  a 
context.  If  existing  macroeconomic  models  provide  any  guide  to  the  future 
(and  doubts  are  legitimate ...  ),  then  faster  growth  in  Europe  would  put 
downward  pressure on  its currencies.  If current  parities are close  to  their 
sustainable equilibrium levels  (and  here  too  there  is ample  room  for  doubt), 
then it would  be  desirable  to accompany  the  fiscal expansion with a  monetary 
policy which  would  avoid significant short  and  medium  term  swings. 
action  1  year 
0.15 
-0.1 
-0.05 
Table  10.  Cross-country  exchange  rate  multipliers 
(10  % depreciation  against all  currencies) 
IMPACT  ON  GDP 
EC  10  USA 
2  years  3  years  1  year  2  years  3  years 
0.5  0.8  -0.1  -0.15  -0.2 
-0.3  -0.5  0.2  0.3  0.35 
-0.1  -0.1  -0.05  -0.1  -0.1 
Japan 
1  year  2  years 
-0.1  -0.1 
-0.3  -0.6 
0.4  0.7 
~:  Compact  model 
3  years 
-0.2 
-0.8 
1.1 -35-
On  the other side  the experience of  the  present  decade  is one  where  currency 
movements  have  been  dominated  by  the dollar and  policy initiatives in  the 
US.  Under  such  conditions it is dangerous  for  Europe  to  try  to stabilise its 
exchange  rates  vis-a-vis  the  dollar  as  it  would  mean  a  severe  loss of 
monetary  policy  independence,  an  undesirable  outcome  given  the  limited gains 
from  transatlantic  coordination  shown  above.  Europe  should  therefore use 
monetary  policy  to offset  exchange  rate pressures  caused  by  its  own  fiscal 
actions  (this prescription concerns  Europe  as  a  whole  vis  a  vis  the  rest of 
the world;  within European  exchange  rate  policies  are  discussed  in  some 
detail  in section 7.2).  Our  proposed  fiscal-monetary  mix  has  precisely  that 
property. 
Offsetting  exchange  rate pressures  may  not  be  appropriate,  however,  in  the 
presence of other  shocks.  Unfortunately,  given  the  amount  of  existing 
uncertainty,  we  cannot  provide  succinctly a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the 
appropriate monetary  policy  responses  to  the  many  disturbances  which  may 
occur. 
6.3.  Policy  implications:  Europe's  autonomy 
The  implications  of  the discussion  so  far  are  clear.  It would  be  futile  to 
aim  at  finely  tuned  coordination of  economic  policies  between  Europe,  the  US 
and  Japan.  Our  simple,  clear  conclusion  cuts  through  an  issue which  the 
interplay of  economics  and  politics has  turned  into  a  complex  (confused?) 
debate.  Ve  believe  that  Europe  should  assume  responsibility for  its own 
economic  policies and  regard  itself  as  an  autonomous  economic  entity.23 
This  conclusion is somewhat  at  variance with  the spirit of efforts initiated 
at  Summit  Meetings  of  the Group  of  Seven,  and  endorsed  in  particular  in 
Section  4.7  of  the  EC  Annual  Report  1986-87- a  point  to which  we  return  in 
Section 7.1.  below. 
23.  To  avoid  ambiguities:  we  are not  arguing  that  Europe  is more  efficient 
in  achieving  coordination,  rather  the  gains  from  coordination with 
Europe  are  that  much  greater  due  to  the  more  open  and  interrelated 
nature of its constituent  economies. -36-
Being  autonomous  does  not  mean  disregarding  the  actions of others,  of 
course.  Vhat  other countries  do  is relevant  to European  policy choices,  and 
must  be  taken  into account.  And  we  refer in Box  3  to  common  responsibilities 
which  Europe  shares with others at  the world  level.  Rather  autonomy  requires 
accepting  one's  responsibilities  without  blaming  others  for  one's 
difficulties.  That  is  exactly  how  Europe  should  approach  its  severe 
unemployment  problem.  The  recent  experience of a  large  US  trade deficit and 
24  an  overvalued dollar with its negligible  impact  on  European  employment, 
confirms  that  we  should  not  expect  miracles  from  increased  exports  to  the  US 
which  presently account  for  only  4  % of Europe's  GOP. 
Vhile  world  macroeconomic  policy  coordination  does  not  seem  to  pass  the 
cost-benefit  test,  there are nevertheless  other areas  of cooperation  that  we 
wish  to  mention  briefly.  One  is  the  international monetary  system,  a  second 
is trade liberalisation,  and  the  third  concerns  the  LDCs.  They  are discussed 
in Box  3. 
BOX  3:  THREE  ITEMS  FOR  VORLD  COOPERATION 
The  prominent  issue is  the  macroeconomic  adjustment  required  by 
the  LDC  debt  problem  and  the U.S.  current  account  deficit.  The 
more  developed  countries  should  cooperate  actively  in  improving 
the growth  potential and  living standards  of  the  LDC's.  Beyond  the 
technical steps needed  to  organize more  realistic  terms  for  the 
debt  and  more  efficient  risk  sharing  between  rich  and  poor 
countries,  the  main  long  run  concern  should  be  to  promote  stable 
growth  of  LDC  exports.  This  calls for  sustained demand  for  these 
exports  from  the  main  industrialized  areas.  As  the  US  are 
attempting  to  reduce  their own  external deficit,  it is  important 
that  the European  surplus  be  reduced  and  reversed  to  make  room  for 
a  surplus  by  the  LDC's,  without  which  their debt  situation can 
only worsen.  In  this  respect  the  policy-mix  advocated  in  this 
paper  which  implies  a  reduction  in  the  Europe-wide  current 
account  surplus,  possibly  turning  it  into  a  deficit  is 
consistent with Europe's  responsibilities  in  the  world  economy. 
24.  Of  course,  that  impact  could  have  been  increased,  had  the  supply 
responsiveness  in Europe  been  greater.  That  lack  of  responsiveness  in 
turn was  probably  influenced  by  the  conviction  that  the  US  deficit  and 
overvalued dollar were  temporary. -37-
A second  area for  cooperation  is a  significant  reduction  of  the 
role  played  by  the dollar on  the  international scene.  As  noted  by 
Oudiz  and  Sachs  (1984,  p.  7,  Table  2  reproduced  here  in Table  11): 
"The  US  dollar remains  the  linchpin of  the world  monetary  system. 
As  shown  in  Table  11,  the  currency  of  denomination  of 
international  reserves,  Euro-dollar  loans,  new  issues  of 
Eurobonds,  and  OPEC  portfolio  wealth  remains  to  a  far  higher 
extent  in  US  dollars  than  te  US  share of world  GNP  would  suggest. 
The  special role of  the  dollar  leads  to  important  asymmetries 
between  the  effects  of  US  policies on  Europe  and  Japan,  and  the 
effects of european  and  Japanese  policies on  the  United  States. 
Shifts  in  the  value  of  the dollar can  have  significant  income 
redistribution effects  throughout  the world  that  may  also  have 
important  demand  consequences;  changes  in  the  value  of  the 
European  currencies or  the Japanese yen  do  not  have  such  effects". 
Vith  all  the  prudence  called  for  in  this difficult area,  we  feel 
that  the  primary  need  remains  that  of  developing  better 
alternatives  to  the  US  dollar  as  international  instrument  of 
reserves,  transactions and  liquidity. 
Table  11.  The  role of  the  US  Dollar 
in internal  finance 
Percent  of  US  dollars 
1975  1978  1981 
Official reserves  79.4  76.9  70.6 
Eurodollar  loans  73.7  67.6  70.6 
Eurobond  issues  47.2  48.2  80.2 
US  share of world  GNP  24.3  25.0  n.a. 
Source:  reproduced  from  Oudiz  and  Sachs 
Table  2 
(1984), 
The  third  issue,  trade liberalisation,  was  discussed  extensively 
in  the  latest report  prepared  for  the  CEPS  Macroeconomic  Policy 
Group  (H.  Giersch  (1987a).  It  would  of  course  be  partly self-
defeating  to  work  towards  smoother  trade  flows  through 
stabilisation  _of  the  dollar,  while  at  the  same  time  accepting 
other  impediments  and  distortions  through  tariffs,  import 
restrictions  and  other  barriers.  Trade  liberalisation  can 
contribute  to supply expansion  and  output  growth  in all  parts  of 
the  world.  It should  be  promoted  now,  and  Europe  should  exercise 
leadership  in  that  respect.  This  issue  cannot  be  overemphasized  at 
a  time  when  protectionist  pressures are rising on  both sides of 
the Atlantic. -38-
7.  Policy coordination within Europe 
7.1.  Cooperation and  the  EMS 
So  far,  the  EMS  has  brought  about  some  cooperation  in monetary,  and  to a 
lesser extent  fiscal,  policies,  but  this is not  by  itself a  guarantee  that 
the  required  policies  will  emerge  naturally.  In  this section we  briefly 
review  the benefits  that  member  countries have  reaped  from  participation  in 
the  EMS,  its  role in encouraging cooperative  behaviour,  and  the  requisite 
conditions  for  cooperation  in  the  two-handed  strategy. 
The  primary  objective  of  the  EMS  is  to deliver bilateral exchange  rate 
stability.  Trade  flows  between  European  countries will  be  more  stable  if 
they  are  not  subject  to volatile exchange  rate movements.  Given  the  large 
share of exports  in value added,  greater stability in  trade carries over  to 
greater  stability  in  output  and  employment.  Thus,  exchange  rate stability 
helps  to  insulate  the  real economy  from  monetary  shocks25.  In addition,  the 
EMS  has  been  instrumental  in  enhancing  the  effectiveness  of  anti-
inflationary policies  in  the early eighties when  all European  countries were 
sharing  the  common  objective of  reducing  their excessive rates of  inflation. 
The  EMS  constraint  of maintaining stable exchange  rates  proved  helpful  to 
that  end  in  two  ways: 
(i) It eliminated  the  temptation  for  individual  countries,  especially  the 
more  open  ones,  to export  their inflation  through  currency appreciation 
26  - a  policy  that obviously could  not  succeed  if pursued  by  all. 
25.  There  is  some  debate  whether  these  objectives  have  been  met.  Rogoff 
(1985)  finds  that  the  EMS  has  made  bilateral  exchange  rates  more 
predictable,  not  necessarily  more  stable.  DeGrauwe  (1987)  compares 
exchange  rate variability before  and  after 1979  and  concludes  that  there 
is  no  obvious  evidence  that  the variability of  bilateral exchange  rates 
has  decreased  more  inside  than  outside  the  EMS. 
26.  Giavazzi  and  Giovannini  (1986)  show,  however,  that  the  EMS  has 
introduced  long-run  trends  in  intra-European  competitiveness,  and 
suggest  that  the  system has  not  prevented  some  European  countries  - at 
least Italy - from  using currency appreciation  to export  inflation. (ii) It  also  enabled 
reputation of  the 
'  27  expectat1ons. 
-39-
member  countries  to  borrow  the  anti-infl~tionary 
Bundesbank  to  help  reduce  domestic  inflationary 
It was  thus  important  for all concerned  to  adhere  as strictly as  possible  to 
the  agreed  exchange  rates.  The  automatic  success  of  the  EMS  as  an  implicit 
tool of  policy coordination resulted  from  the  fact  that  the  tool  was  ideally 
suited  to  the main  priority of  the  day  - the  elimination of  inflation - an 
objective which  was  shared  by  all countries. 
To  the extent  that  the  system  functions  as  it should  (and  has  done  so  far), 
it reduces  substantially  the  leeway  for  independent  interest  rate  policies 
in  the  member  states.  Participation in  the  EMS  amounts  to  a  surrender,  by 
all but  one  country,  of  domestic  interest rates as  an  unrestricted  policy 
instrument.  It  also  implies  the  surrender  of  the  exchange  rate as  an 
instrument  for equilibrating  the  current  account.  Rather,  it  entails  an 
implicit  commitment  to  achieve  long-run  external  solvency  by  price 
adjustment  alone.  At  the  same  time,  the  EMS  countries  retain  the  option  of 
floating  together  vis-a-vis  the  rest  of  the  world,  thereby achieving 
external  balance  in  a  manner  which  individual  member  countries  have 
forfeited  by  joining  the  EMS. 
The  EMS,  however,  does  not  enforce automatic  cooperation of  fiscal  policies. 
It  may  provide a  useful  framework  for  cooperation,  but  does  not  substitute 
for  the  sort  of  negotiation  required  to  enact  mutually  beneficial 
policies.28  An  important  feature  of  the  environment  in which  cooperation 
must  take  place is  the  fact  that  the  various European  countries  start  from 
different  initial  conditions.  With  different  initial conditions,  there  is 
still room  for  cooperation,  but  it may  lead  to  varied  policy actions  in  the 
different  countries.  We  call this  "flexible"  cooperation.  We  address  this 
27.  See  Giavazzi  and  Pagano  (1986). 
28.  The  EMS  merely  reduces  the  possible  policy  choices  of  its  member 
countries  but  does  not  restrict  them  completely,  leaving  room  for 
coordination,  or  the  absence  of it.  See  Begg  and  Wyplosz  (1987). -40-
issue  in  the next  section.  Ve  shall  then  consider another aspect  whi.ch  also 
complicates  the  matter:  the possibility that  policy objectives  may  differ 
among  the various  countries. 
7.2.  Cooperative growth  with differentiated initial conditions 
7.2.1.  The  setting 
Differences  in initial conditions  matter  because  they alter  the  constraints 
on  policy choices.  In  the  present  context,  we  have  identified  three  such 
constraints  (section  3.3):  inflation,  the  public debt,  and  the external 
debt.  Ve  have  already stressed  that  inflation need  not  be  a  threat  because 
the  two-handed  approach  incorporates  significant  contributions  to  cost  and 
price stability.  Looking  at  the  current situation  we  note  that,  for  the 
first  time  in  twenty  years,  Europe's  average  inflation rate  (as  measured  by 
the CPI)  has  receded  to  its  level  of  the  mid-sixties.  Yet  differences 
between  countries  remain  substantial,  with  the  four  Mediterranean  countries 
well  above  the  European  average,  the  UK  close  to  it,  and  the  remaining 
countries  below  it.  The  inflationary  position of  the southern countries 
should  thus  be  kept  in mind,  while  the  respite in  trend  inflation is put  to 
good  use.  The  relevant  data are displayed  in Figure  2. 
Figure  2 
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Differences  in  the state of  the  public  finances  amongst  the  European  nations 
are clearly recognised  in  the  Annual  Report  of  the  EC  Commission.  In 
particular  the  Report  stresses  that  budget  deficits  in several member 
countries are already  so  high  that  they  must  be  reduced  rather  than 
increased  further  - for  otherwise  the  burden  of  public debt  would  soon  grow 
beyond  control.  (Figure  3  brings  out  clearly  the association between  public 
debts  and  deficits).  Hence  the  Commission's  recommendation  that  fiscal 
expansion should start in Germany,  with  France  and  the  UK  following. 
Figure  3 
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This  internal constraint has  now  to  be  connected  to  the other  important  one, 
namely  the  external  constraint.  The  two-handed  growth  strategy should  be 
viewed  against  the  background  of  Figure  4,  where  the  twelve  EC  countries 
(Belgium  and  Luxembourg  combined)  are  located  in  terms  of  their net -42-
government  debt/GNP  ratio  {horizontally)  and  of  their  current  account 
29  deficit/GNP  ratio  (vertically  ).  Each  country is represented  by  a  circle 
with area proportional  to  the  country's  GNP.  Two  solid lines  are  drawn  at 
the  {weighted)  averages  of  the  ratios  for  EC  12. 
7.2.2.  The  principles 
A supply-friendly fiscal expansion,  with monetary  accommodation,  should  lead 
to a  temporary  increase of  the  net  debt/GNP  ratio  and  to  a  temporary 
deterioration  of  the  current  account/GNP  ratio.  This  implies  that  the  EC 
averages  in Figure 4  should  move  north-east. 
The  movement  of  the  averages  does  not,  however,  require  that  each  individual 
country  moves  north-east.  Actually,  the  position of  some  countries  in Figure 
4  is  such  that  they  would  preefer  to  move  in a  different direction.  In 
particular,  Italy,  Ireland  and  Belgium  are  trying  to  move  westward,  so  as  to 
reduce  the  weight  of  their  public  debt.  (The  Annual  Report  of  the  EC 
Commission  recommands  indeed  that  these  countries  continue  their efforts  at 
budget  consolidation.)  Simmilarly,  Denmark  and  Greece  would  like  to  move 
southward,  to  reduce  their external deficit.  (Ye  return  to  these  specific 
country  tendencies  below.) 
Flexible cooperation,  as distinct  from  policy  synchronisation,  does  not 
require  all  countries  to  move  in  the  same  direction.  Instead,  it tries  to 
define country-specific policies  that  tend  to  the  common  goal,  while  duly 
taking  into  account  the differences  in initial conditions.  Yhat  does  that 
mean,  in present  circumstances? 
29.  In principle,  we  would  prefer  to  measure  the external constraint  through 
the  net  external debt  rather  than  through  the  current account.  However, 
official  figures  for  net  external debt  are often lacking,  and  therefore 
seldom  used,  so  we  use  the  more  familiar  figures.  On  the  basis  of 
cumulative  current  account  data  since  1960,  we  have  constructed  net 
external  debt  estimates  and  used  them  in  Figure  5.  The  picture does  not 
differ  much  from  that  of  Figure  4  and  may  be  used  interchangeably.  Ye 
have  already  discussed  this  issue  in section 3.3.4.  and  will return  to 
it below. -43-
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7.2.3.  Flexible cooperation 
Countries  located  in  the  south-west  quadrant  need  not  worry  about  their debt 
or external position  (Germany  is  the  obvious  and  well-known  instance).  It 
can  adopt  the  two-handed  strategy wholeheartedly.  As  a  consequence,  Germany 
moves  north-east  and  pushes  the  EC  average  (aggregate)  in  that direction.  As 
that  happens,  the  remaining  countries  benefit  from  an  externality (the 
additional  imports  of Germany)  which  would  tend  to  push  them  in  a  south-
westerly  direction if they  remained  passive,  i.e.  if they  kept  their public 
spending and  tax  rates  unchanged.  Indeed,  they export  more,  which  improves 
their  current  accounts,  raises  their  GNP  (by  a  smaller  percentage)  and 
reduces  their public deficits.  The  net  effect  for  EC  12  aggregates  is  still 
a  displacement  north-east,  but  by  less  than  the  initial impulse  which  is 
dampened  by  the externalities. 
In  order  to  avoid  the  dampening,  it is desirable  that  the  countries  located 
near  the  boundary  of  the  south-west  quadrant  should  also  follow  the  two-
handed  strategy  and  move  north-east  of  their own  initiative.  Looking  at 
Figure 4,  we  see  that  France,  the  UK  and  the  Netherlands  fall  in  that 
category.  Spain  is in  the  same  quadrant  as  Germany  and  on  the  surface shares 
the  same  degrees  of  freedom;  due  account  should,  however,  be  given  to  the 
fact  that  Spain  (as  well  as  Portugal  and  Greece)  are  in a  difficult 
transition  phase  as  they  gradually  integrate  their  economies  to  the 
Community.  Together,  France,  the  UK,  the  Netherlands  and  Spain  account  for 
some  51  %of  EC  12  GNP.  Adding  Germany,  we  now  have  77  %  of  the  community 
engaged  in  the  supply-friendly fiscal  expansion and  unambiguously  pushing 
the aggregate north-east,  in spite  of  some  residual  dampening  from  the 
remaining  smaller  countries.  The  two-handed  growth  strategy for  Europe  is 
then definitely under  way.  It seems  clear  to  us  that  such  cooperative action 
is  far  more  effective  than  a  repeat  of  the  "German  locomotive  experiment". 
The  bulk of  the  impact  comes  from  the  joint initiatives of  Germany,  France 
and  the  UK  which  together account  for  65  % of  EC  12  GNP. 
Vhat  about  the  remaining countries? If  they  remain  passive,  they  move  south-
west.  Although  their dampening  effect on  the aggregates  is  now  reduced,  it 
is still there.  Could  it  be  avoided?  It  could  indeed,  because  their 
antisymmetrical positions  relative  to  the  new  averages  allows  for  offsetting -45-
movements  which  eliminate  the  dampening.  More  specifically,  if  Denmark  and 
Greece  moved  south-east,  whereas  Belgium  and  Italy moved  north-west,  the 
aggregate of  these  four  countries  could  remain  roughly  unchanged,  allowing 
the  expansion initiated in  the  other countries  to work  out  its full effects 
withoug  dampening.  Let  us  look at  the  implied  policies. 
The  clearest  case is  that  of Belgium.  That  country is currently engaged  in 
an  effort  to  reduce  its  budget  deficit.  Although  that  effort  will  be 
facilitated  by  the faster growth  of neighbouring countries,  it should still 
be  pursued.  The  current  account  will  then  display an  even  larger  surplus, 
whereas  the  country  should  move  north-west.  The  surplus will naturally be 
reduced  in due  time  by  a  currency appreciation.  The  same  policy  conclusion 
holds  for  Italy,  although  the  implied appreciation would  be  less marked 
(both  because  the  initial position  involves  a  smaller  surplus  and  because 
the  smaller  degree  of  openness  leads  to  less  pronounced  externalities). 
Conversely,  Denmark  would  see its current  account  improve  under  the  export 
pull.  That  country  should  adopt  a  more  expansionary  fiscal  stance,  in order 
to  move  eastward  (contrary  to  the  westward  tendency  associated  with  a 
passive  fiscal  stance).  If  the  fiscal  expansion  did  more  than offset  the 
current  account  improvement,  then  a  slight  currency  depreciation  would 
follow.  The  same  thing applies  to Greece,  although  to  a  lesser extent.  Ve 
thus  see how  Belgium,  Italy,  Denmark  and  Greece  could  play  their  role  by 
ensuring  that  no  dampening  of  the  initial impulses  occurs.  The  implication 
of  the  required  policies is some  ancillary currency  realignments,  involving 
mainly  the  Belgian  frank and  the  Danish  crown.  Finally,  Ireland  could  remain 
"passive"  and  move  against  the  tide  - but  that  country  accounts  for  less 
than  1  % of  EC  12  GNP  or  trade. 
Yhat  remains  to  be  spelled out  are  the  accompanying  monetary  policies.  Given 
that  in  each  country  fiscal  policy is set  as  suggested  above,  choosing  a 
particular monetary  policy is equivalent  to  the  choice  of  an  exchange  rate 
policy,  which  leads  to  a  consideration of  the  role of  the  EMS  (assuming  that 
the  UK,  although not  part  of  the  EMS,  stabilises  the  ECU  value  of  the 
Pound).  As  discussed  above,  one  of  the  main  merits  of  the  EMS  is  the  fact 
that it provides  a  credible nominal  anchor  for  price levels  across  Europe. 
The  system  has  proven  flexible enough  to  periodically accomodate  divergent -~-
trends,  but  it has  also penalized  (through  loss  of  competitiveness)  the  more 
inflation-prone  countries  in  Europe.  It  has  thus  provided  a  credible 
incentive not  to  resort  to  inflationary policies. 
All  this  is crucial for  the  policies we  advocate.  A strong commitment  to  the 
EMS  lends credibility to  the  annoucement  that  a  temporary  budget  deficit 
will  not  be  paid  for  through  inflationary  finance:  it thus  reduces  the 
pressures  towards  exchange  rate  depreciation  that  arise  whenever  the 
government's  ability  to  generate  future  budget  surpluses  is  in doubt.  Of 
course  the enhanced  credibility provided  by  the  EMS  cannot  eliminate  the 
possibility  of speculative attacks:  these  should  be  jointly resisted  by  the 
central banks  of  the  member  countries. 
In  the  longer  run  we  cannot  rule out  the  possibility  that  the  fiscal actions 
necessary  to  implement  the  two-handed-strategy  may  require an  adjustment  of 
relative  prices  among  European  countries.  However,  the size and  even  the 
sign,  of  these adjustments are difficult  to anticipate,  as  they  depend  on  a 
number  of  (often  counteracting)  factors:  the degree  of substitutability 
among  debt  issued  by  different  governments  and  denominated  in  different 
currencies  is,  for  example,  an  important  one,  and  one  on  which  we  know  very 
little. The  flexibility built  in  the  EMS  will  prove  valuable  in making  these 
relative price adjustment  possible- if and  when  the  time  comes.30 
The  foregoing analysis  suggests  unambiguously  that  the  cooperative  growth 
strategy  is  feasible,  in  spite  of  substantial  differences  in initial 
conditions.  It also illustrates  vividly  that  cooperation  should  not  be 
confused with synchronisation. 
30.  For  an  analysis of  these  effects  see  Sachs  and  Vyplosz  (1984)  for 
further analysis of  these  issues.  Needless  to  say  we  fully  recognize  the 
merits of  the  relative stability  of  exchange  rates  within  EMS.  The 
formulation  in  the  text  assumes  that  our  policy  recommendations  become 
implemented  from  a  starting  situation  characterized  by  sustainable 
exchange  rates.  If that were  not  to  be  the  case,  one  should  distinguish 
carefully  the  consequences  of  the starting situation from  those  of  the 
policy actions. -47-
7.3 Differences  in policy objectives 
The  strategy  outlined  in  the  previous  section  assumes  common  policy 
objectives among  all countries,  namely  a  high priority given  to  the  fight 
against  unemployment.  Yet  Denmark  has  recently gone  through  a  period  of 
drastic budget  consolidation,  and  might  be  reluctant  to  go  into  deficit 
again.  More  significantly,  Germany  has  a  deep-rooted  aversion  to  inflation, 
and  might  be  reluctant  to  participate  in  a  strategy  where  the  fiscal 
expansion  anticipates  the acceleration of growth  in supply.  Even  though  we 
believe  that hesitation is ill-advised,  it is  nevertheless  instructive  to 
discuss  its implications.  If Germany  did  not  participate in  the  cooperative 
growth strategy,  the  remaining  countries would  have  to  choose  between  giving 
up  that strategy altogether,  or carrying it out  on  their own.  Yhat  would  the 
latter alternative look like? 
The  bulk of  the expansion would  now  come  from  France,  the  UK,  Spain  and  the 
Netherlands.  As  noted  above,  these  four  countries  account  for  51  % of  EC  12 
GNP,  as  opposed  to  77  %  with Germany.  A rough  calculation suggests  the 
extent  of  the  collective loss  incurred  by  carrying out  the  strategy  without 
active  German  participation.  Using  the  ratio  to  GOP  of  extra-community 
imports of goods  as  a  rough  measure  of  openness,  we  get  a  figure  of  13.4  % 
for  EC  10.  Leaving out  Germany,  the  corresponding  figure  for  the  remaining  9 
countries  jumps  to  18.6  %,  up  by  a  full 5  %.  In  relative  terms,  the  degree 
of  openness  of  EC  10  goes  up  by  nearly 40  % if Germany  is left out!  The  cost 
to  the  remaining 9  countries of Germany's  failure  to  participate  in  the 
concerted  expansion  is  thus  serious,  in  terms  of  import  leakages  and  terms 
of  trade deterioration. 
Now  France  and  the  UK  are  in  the  frontline  (the dotted  lines on  Figures  4 
and  5  show  the  EC  averages  when  Germany  is  left  out)  and  are  quite 
vulnerable  with  respect  to  their external position.  Furthermore,  a  fiscal 
e,xpansion  without  Germany  may  well entail some  loss of credibility  for  the 
monetary  authorities  and  put  additional  pressure  on  the  exchange  rates of 
the  expanding  countries.  In  practice,  this  amounts  to  an  effective 
appreciation  of  the  OM.  In  fact,  what  is required,  is an  agreement  with 
Germany  to disagree,  namely  a  revaluation of  the  OM  within  the  EMS;  in  a -48-
sense  this  would  be  the German  contribution  to  cooperation.  If of a  proper 
magnitude,  and  if accompanied  in  the devaluing countries  by  wage  and  price 
moderation  the  overriding  condition  of  success  in any  case  - such  a 
realignment  would  ensure  that  the  collective  current  account  of  the 
expanding  countries does  not  become  a  source of major  concern.  Besides  this 
general  change,  the  rest of  the  recommandations  of  the  previous  section 
apply,  except  that  the  fiscal  expansion  is  stronger  (even  though  less 
effective) wherever  it is enacted,  and  the  overall expansion is dampened  by 
Germany's  passive fiscal stance. 
In addition  to  being less effective overall,  that  alternative  entails  the 
additional  cost  of  more  pronounced  currency  realignments.  And  it entails 
Germany  losing competitiveness  through  appreciation  and  ending  up  with 
increased  unemployment.  Through  that  channel,  an  inflation/unemployment 
tradeoff seems  inescapable,  even  in a  country  to which  the  Phillips  curve 
analysis  is  sometimes  hold  inapplicable.31  Thus,  not  only  the  expanding 
countries suffer  from  the  lack of German  cooperation,  but  Germany  ends  up 
with more  unemployment  (and  less  inflation)  than  in  the alternative scenario 
of  the  previous  section.  This  confirms  the  avantages  of  cooperation,  but 
also  suggests  that  cooperation may  arise indirectly:  faced  with  a  one-sided 
expansion elsewhere  in Europe,  it would  still be  to Germany's  advantage  to 
adopt  the  two-handed  strategy. 
8.  Conclusion 
Ve  have  restated  the  reasons  why  Europe  needs  policy actions  to extricate 
itself from  its slow  growth,  high  unemployment,  trap.  Because  of  the  complex 
reasons  lying: behind  the underutilisation of  productive  resources,  and  the 
continuing failure  to  speed  up  the  accumulation of  resources,  the  required 
policies  must  work  on  both  the  supply and  the  demand  sides.  The  two-handed 
strategy aims  at  making  the  economy  more  efficient  in  mobilizing  its 
31.  Phillips  curve  equations  for  Germany  appear  to  have  been  successfully 
estimated,  among  others,  by  Franz  (1985),  Koenig  and  Franz  (1986),  and 
Bean,  Layard  and  Nickell  (1986). -~-
existing resources  and  readier  to  increase  them.  It works  on  the  supply-side 
through a  mix  of  competition-enhancing  measures  as  well  as  cost-cutting 
fiscal action.  It simultaneously works  on  the  demand  side  through  labour  tax 
cuts.  Demand  feeds  into supply  by  providing  the  producers  with  the  necessary 
lo~g  term  demand  incentives  to  hire  labour  and  increase  productive 
equipment.  Simultaneously,  all available opportunities  for  productive  public 
investment  should  be  seized,  both  by  the  EC  itself and  by  member  countries. 
Productive public  investments  may  without  reservation be  financed  by  capital 
inflows.  Ve  regard  the  inflationary risk of  this strategy as  moderate  and 
well worth  taking. 
In  reviewing  the  reasons  behind  the  past  reluctance  to  adopt  the  two-handed 
strategy,  we  have  emphasized  the  role of openess,  and  found  it  useful  to 
separate  out  the situation of  individual  countries  from  the  position of  the 
European  Community  as  a  whole. 
As  a  whole,  the  EC  is quite closed.  The  current  account  constraint,  while 
not  to  be  overlooked,  is  therefore relatively unimportant.  The  implication 
is  that  the  EC  should  not  make  the  adoption  of  the  two-handed  strategy 
contingent  on  reaching a  cooperative agreement  with  the  US  and  Japan.  Europe 
should  assert  its autonomy  and  adopt  the  policies  that suit it best.  This, 
of course,  does  not  mean  that  Europe  should  completely  ignore  the  external 
effects  of  these  policies,  nor  that  she  should  renege  on  her obligations 
towards  the  rest  of  the  world.  Two  important  issues  emerge  in  this 
connection.  First,  the  financial  links are  important,  fast  and  powerful. 
This  implies  that  exchange  rate management  requires  considerable  caution. 
However,  this  is not  a  one-sided  issue and  avoiding disruption will  require 
some  cooperation with  the  US  and  Japan.  In particular,  a  better  functioning 
international  monetary  system  remains  a  desirable objective.  The  second 
important  issue  concerns  the  LDC  debt  problem.  At  a  time  when  the  US  must 
close  its  external deficit,  current  account  surpluses  in  the  indebted  LDCs 
will require deficits elsewhere,  particularly  in  Europe.  The  two-handed 
strategy would  bring  this about. 
Cooperation within  the  EC  is an  altogether different  matter.  An  important 
implication  of  openness  and  all EC  countries are very  open  - is  that  a -50-
fiscal expansion is both less effective and  more  costly,  the  more  open  is 
the  economy.  Supply-side  policies,  on  the other hand,  tend  to  become  more 
desirable as  the degree of  openness  rises.  The  inescapable  conclusion  is 
that  the  external  constraint  is likely  to  play havoc  with  the  two-handed 
strategy:  it favors  only one  hand,  supply-side policies.  A  full  commitment 
to  the strategy  therefore  requires  that  the external constraint  be  loosened 
and  that  requires  fiscal  cooperation. 
Cooperation  is  not  synonymous  with  synchronisation.  Because  economic 
conditions  (chiefly inflation,  the  public and  external debts)  differ accross 
countries,  policies  too will have  to differ.  Flexible cooperation  recognizes 
this  fact  and  calls  for  a  clear  understanding  of  the  role  of  different 
initial  conditions.  Rather  than  repeating  the  Bonn  Summit  approach  of 
staging a  fiscal  expansion with Germany  taking  the  lead  and  France  and  the 
UK  following  suit,  we  think  that it would  be  more  effective for  the  three 
countries  to  move  simultaneously.  The  other countries  may  move  less,  or  not 
move  at all,  or use  their exchange  rates  in accordance  with  their particular 
initial conditions. 
A  particularly difficult situation arises when  there  is disagreement  on  the 
policy objectives,  especially if a  large country  is concerned.  This  would  be 
the  case  should Germany  put  a  higher weight,  relative  to  other countries,,,on 
stabilizing its public  finances  and  pursuing  disinflation,  and  a  lower 
weight  on  resuming  growth  and  reducing unemployment.  This  would  leave  much 
of  the  burden  on  the  two  remaining  large countries which  can  afford  to  adopt 
fiscal  measures.  Ye  think  that  Europe  can  resume  faster growth  even  without 
fiscal expansion  in Germany,  but  the  inevitable cost  would  be  a  significant 
appreciation  of  the  mark  within  the  EMS  would  entail a  less  favourable 
outcome  on  inflation and  unemployment  in  France  and  the  UK,  and  a  serious 
threat  of  rising unemployment  in Germany. 
As  is often  the  case,  black and  white  conclusions  are  deceptive.  The  choice 
is  not  necessarily  between  a  fully  coordinated  two-handed  strategy or  the 
continuation of  the statu-quo.  Each  country  stands  to  benefit  from  the 
strategy.  The  more  each  country expands,  the  more  favourable  is  the  outlook 
in  the  remaining countries.  The  larger is  the  number  of expanding  countries, -51-
the  larger are  the gains  to  each  of  them  individually.  Thus,  all that it is 
needed  is  that all,  or  some  of,  those  countries which  can  afford  it,  and 
fortunately  the  larger  countries  can,  adopt  the  two-handed  stragegy.  The 
others will  then either follow,  when  they  can,  or  simply  share  in  the 
benefits.  How  far  each  country  travels  the  proposed  route  in  the  end  will 
depend  on  its starting position. -52-
APPENDIX  1:  A SUGGESTIVE  FIVE-FINGERED  EXERCISE 
In  the Island of  Flexco,  there is  an  output  potential  of  one  mumm  per 
period,  controlled  by  a  multinational  company  and  produced  with  labour 
alone.  The  island has  two  inhabitants,  Richard  and  Mason,  and  a  combined 
treasury-central  bank,  the Bank  of  Flexco  (BOF).  The  local currency,  called 
uce,  exchanges  for  yens  one  to  one.  At  time  1 Richard  holds  100  uces  and  the 
central  bank's  reserves  amount  to  100  yens.  Richard  has  decided  to  buy  one 
mumm,  which  costs  100  uces,  in period  2.  Accordingly  he  deposits  his  100 
uces  at  the  central bank  for  one  period  and  will receive  an  interest of  SO 
%.  In what  follows  his situation will remain  unchanged:  in period  2  he  will 
own  one  mumm  and  SO  uces.  The  BOF  also earns  a  50  % interest  per  period  on 
its yen  holdings. 
Mason  would  like  to  buy  one  mumm  as  soon  as  possible but  has  no  money.  He 
has  offered his  labour services  to  the  company  but  is not  hired  in period  1 
due  to  lack  of  demand.  He  will  be  hired  in  period  2  to  produce  the  mumm 
ordered  by  Richard,  for  which  he  will get  a  salary of  100  uces  and  will  then 
be  able  to  purchase  a  mumm  for  himself,  but  is upset  to  have  to wait.  He 
could  borrow  from  Richard,  but  they  do  not  know  each  other.  The  result  is 
that  Mason  will order his  mumm  in period  2  and  receive it in period  3.  Are 
there possibilities of  improving  the  island's  welfare  relatively  to  the 
baseline situation just described? 
One  possibility is for  the  BOF  to give  to Mason  the  100  uces  deposited  by 
Richard  as  a  pure  transfer,  and  announce  a  tax of  60  % on  labour  income. 
Mason  will  then order one  mumm  at  once  and  will  be  hired  by  the  company  to 
produce  it.  Practically,  he  will  pay  the  mumm  upon  ordering,  will receive 
his salary at  time  of hiring,  immediately  pay  a  tax of  60  uces  and  deposit 
the  remaining  40  uces  at  the  BOF.  All  this  happens  simultaneously at  the 
beginning of  period  1,  with interest of  50  % accruing at  the  beginning  of 
period  2.  The  situation  of  Mason  has  now  improved.  In period  2  he  owns  a 
mumm  since period  2  plus  100  in cash  (his  period  1  net  earnings  of  40 
augmented  of  20  in interest and  his  period  2  net  earnings  of  40).  As  for  the 
BOF,  it has  used  the 50  yens  it earned  on  its reserve holdings  in  period  2 -53-
to  back  the  creation  of 50  uces  required  to  pay  back Richard  150  uces  in 
capital and  interest,  as it only  received  from  Mason  60  in  taxes  and  40  in 
deposit.  (In period  3 it will use  the  60  uces  levied as  taxes  from  Mason  to 
pay  back his deposit  of 40  plus  interest of  20.)  Relative  to  the  baseline 
situation  the  net  addition  to  the  island'  assets is  the  locally produced 
mumm  of Mason.  The  tax-subsidy mix  has  raised demand  during  the  period  of 
slack,  with a  balanced  inter-temporal  budget,  and  has  boosted  real  income  to 
the  same  extent. 
Suppose  however  that  Mason  uses his subsidy  to  buy  yens  from  the  BOF  and 
import  a  Japanese  mumm.  The  BOF  loses  its  reserves  and  the  associated 
interest  income,  which  forces  it to  raise  income  taxes  to  100  %.  This  of 
course allows  Mason  to  order  immediately  a  Japanese  mumm  which,  we  assume, 
he  will  receive in period  2  (given  the  remoteness  of Japan  from  the  island 
of  Flexco).  On  the other side Mason  is not  hired  in period  1  to  produce  his 
mumm  which  is imported  from  Japan,  so  he  foregoes  period  1  income  and  all 
his  period  2  income  is  taxed  away.  The  BOF  ends  up  with  no  assets  and  a 
liability of 50  uces  to serve Richard's  interest.  One  could  argue  that  these 
uces  (the monetisation of  the deficit)  are worthless  - or equivalently  that 
a  tax  of  100% of  interest  income  would  be  needed  to avoid  the liability. 
The  change  reelatively  to  the  baseline is  the  one-period-ahead  mumm  of  Mason 
at  the  loss of  the  BOF's  foreign  reserves  - i.e.  no  net gain. 
Vhile endless variations  of  this allegory are possible,  it  illustrates  two 
important  points  about  a  fiscal expansion  in an  open  economy.  First,  that 
demand  failures offer a  prospect  for welfare gains.  Two,  that  openness,  more 
precisely  the  marginal  propensity  to  import,  works  towards  cancelling  that 
prospect. -54-
APPENDIX  2  HOV  TO  MEASURE  OPENNESS 
An  economy  is open  if  international  trade  and  financial  movements  are 
important  for  its functioning,  and  thereby  for  the  welfare of its members. 
Financial movements  affect  the interest and  exchange  rates and  may  have  real 
effects  as  well  as  impose  a  constraint on  policy making.  This  is an  issue 
that  we  will consider later on.  The  importance  of  trade  can  take  several 
forms.  One  of  them  is  the dependence  on  imports  for essential procurements 
like food  or energy.  Another  is  the  dependence  on  exports  for  marketing 
domestic  resources,  like natural  resources  or  labour.  An  absolute measure  of 
that  importance would  call for  a  comparison  of  welfare  levels  with  and 
without  trade.  Such  a  measure  is difficult  to  construct  and  its practical 
significance is limited  by  the  very  nature  of  the  question  raised  a 
rhetorical  question  in  most  cases  since  autarky  is hardly a  realistic 
option. 
Rather,  we  are  concerned  with  the  macroeconomic  policy  implications  of 
openness.  That  is a  very different,  and  quite specific question.  As  shown  in 
the  previous  section it arises only  in  the  presence of  some  disequilibrium 
which  requires,  and  justifies,  the use  of macroeconomic  policies.  In  that 
case,  the  degree  of  openness  affects  the  cost  and  effectiveness  of 
macroeconomic  policies  through  two  channels:  income  flows  and  the  terms  of 
trade.  For  these specific purposes  a  rough  measure  of  the degree of openness 
of an  economy  is  the ratio of  imports  or exports  to  national  income.  That 
measure  is  too  rough,  though,  when  exports  themselves  have  a  significant 
import  content.  A corrected measure,  the  ratio  to national  income  of  imports 
net  of  import  content  of exports,  coincides with  the  share of value added 
which  is exported  when  the  trade  account  is in balance. 
To  understand  how  these  ratios  represent  income  flows  it helps  to  consider 
first  the  extreme  case where  exports  have  a  negligible  import  content,  and 
consist  basically of value added.  Vhen  domestic  demand  expands,the  increment 
is  distributed  between  imports  and  domestic  output  in  proportions 
corresponding  to  the  marginal  propensity  to  import.  The  average  propensity 
to  import  is  only  relevant  in  this  context  because  of  the  empirical -55-
observation  that elasticities of  imports  with  respect  to national  jncome  are 
much  more  similar across  countries  than  marginal  propensities  to  import.32 
Although  measures  of  import  elasticities  tend  to  be  biased  upwards  away  from 
unity  because  of  the growing  structural  independence  over  the  sample  period, 
with  the  size of  the  bias  likely  to  vary  from  country  to  country,  measured 
elasticities seem  to  be  clustered  remarkably  around  1.3,  implying  corrected 
elasticities  around  a  value of 1.1 or 1.2.  Marginal  propensities  to  import 
dM/dY  are  then well  approximated  by  a  stable  (across  counries)  multiple  of 
import  shares  M/Y  say  1.2  M/Y.  The  degree of  import  leakage  is  thus 
proportional  to  the  import  share. 
Turning  now  to  terms  of  trade  effects,  and  still neglecting  the  import 
content  of exports,  consider a  depreciation which  leaves  unchanged  the  value 
added  deflator.  The  welfare  cost  is  measured  to  the  first order  by  the 
volume  of  imports  times  the  rate  of  depreciation.  As  a  percentage  of 
national  income  that  cost  is equal  to  the  import  share  M/Y  times  the  rate of 
depreciation.  It is  thus  proportional  to  the  import  share  for  a  given  rate 
of depreciation. 
This  argument  would  be  deceptive if  the  rate  of  depreciation  needed  to 
correct  a  given  imbalance  were  itself inversely proportional  to  M/Y,  leaving 
the  product  independent  of  the  degree  of  openness.  It is difficult  to  rule 
out  that  possibility  generally,  in  particular  without  reference  to  the 
imbalance  to  be  corrected.  An  interesting case,  of direct  relevance  to  our 
discussion  in  the  report,  arises  when  the  imbalance  is a  trade deficit 
generated  by  an  expansion of domestic  demand.  In  such  a  case,  the  required 
rate  of  depreciation is proportional  to  the  rate of  demand  expansion,  with 
the  factor  of proportionality depending  upon  trade  elasticities  and  being 
thus  to  a  first approximation  independent  of  the  degree  of  openness.  Yrite 
both exports  X and  imports  M,  evaluated  in  foreign  currencies,  as  functions 
32.  The  estimated  elasticities  of  imports  with  respect  to  final  domestic 
demand  range  from  1.2  to 1.8  in  the  COMETE  model,  and  from  1.1  to  1.6  in 
the  DESMOS  model,  both of which  include all major  European  countries. 
The  COMPACT  elasticity  for  EC  10  as  a  whole  1.3.  Scattered  import 
equations  for  individual  European  countries,  that  we  came  across  more 
recently,  give similar figures. -56-
of  (among  other  things)  a  "relative price" variable p,  which  might  be  world 
prices  PV  divided  by  the  product  of  home  prices  (or  costs)  P8  times  the 
exchange  rate  e.  The  trade  account  A  is X - M,  so  that,  writing n for 
elasticities, 
dA  X  H 
de  =  - e  l'lxp  +  e  ~P' 
Expansion  of domestic  final demand  D by  a  given  percentage  tt  will affect  the 
current  account  in  an  amount  tt.D.(aH/aD).  The  adjustment  in  the  exchange 
rate needed  to  restore  the current  account  balance is  thus given  by 
~D  ~D 
(X  (X--
h__  - !h__  - ~p - llxp 
··Mp  H 'Xp 
Of  course we  need  to correct  for  the  import  content  of exports.  The  simplest 
way  is  to net  them  out  so as  to  consider net  imports.  Indeed  an  increase  in 
domestic demand  will not  by  itself influence  the volume  of exports,  at least 
if  we  neglect  the  feedback  effects.  (To  take  into account  the  feedback 
effects would  require more  complex  calculations  involving matrices  of bilat-
eral flows).  Neglecting  the  feedback effects leads  us  to understate openness 
but  the  bias is not  important  in  the  short  run,  and  only marginally  related 
to  the  degree of openness  itself.  Neglecting  the  import  content  of  exports 
would  introduce a  severe bias more  or less proportional  to  the  degree  of 
openness  itself  because  exports are nearly equal  to  imports.  (Actually  the 
import  content  of exports  is likely to rise with openness,  making  the  bias 
an  increasing function of openness.) -57-
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